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INTRODUCTION

Six short years ago, the National Groundwater Policy Forum (Forum) declared the nation "fortunate" that groundwater contamination had not yet reached critical proportions.' The Forum called
upon federal, state, and local governments to join with private industries and public interest groups to form an environmental partnership
geared to comprehensive groundwater management. The Forum
urged these entities to take immediate forceful action, through the
enactment of state and federal laws, to maintain and protect this valuable natural resource.2
Lawmakers and the public at large failed to rally behind this cause,
abandoning groundwater in this country to the patchwork purview of
individual states. Arguably, such apparent laxity is not surprising
based on the longstanding tendency of the legislative and judicial systems to overlook the relationship between surface waters and groundwaters. Although surface waters are subject to stringent controls,
groundwaters, largely because they have been hydrologically misunderstood, have been recognized as incidental to ownership of property
and, as such, have been only sporadically regulated per se.3 In the
western states where water is crucial to economic stability, political
concerns related to the regulation of underground water-pumping

1. THE NATIONAL GROUNDWATER POL'Y FORUM, FINAL REPORT, Groundwater Saving the Unseen Resource 8 (The Conservation Foundation 1987).
2. Id.; see also id. at 31-32.
3. New Mexico has historically recognized the relationship of groundwater to surface
water. See generally Robert Emmet Clark, New Mexico Water Law Since 1955, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 484 (1962) (tracing history of New Mexico water law).
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have exacerbated the sluggish approach of lawmakers to the protection of groundwaters.

Conversely, in nearby Mexico, groundwater has been directly addressed by the federal government and the citizenry. Mexico has
carefully delineated groundwater jurisdiction and has provided what
appears to be ample means of government regulation.
In the spring of 1992, the Integrated Environmental Plan for the
Mexico-United States Border Area (Plan) was jointly issued by the

Environmental Protection Agency of the United States (EPA) and the
Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE). 4 The Plan
makes apparent that the "fortunate" condition of groundwater has
changed dramatically in certain areas along the border,5 consistent
with repeated warnings of a multitude of commentators. 6 The Plan
emphasizes the need for immediate monitoring of groundwater qual-

ity and proposes that solutions to problems be advanced under the

existing legal framework. 7 This legal framework must take cognizance of groundwater jurisdiction shared by the United States, the
four border states, the EPA, the SEDUE, and Mexico's National
Water Commission (CNA). 8 The Plan further provides that the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) shall be a vehicle for information-gathering. 9 Apparently, resolutions are to be

4. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVTL. PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA (FIRST
STAGE, 1992-1994) (1992). An initial version of the Plan was issued in draft form on August
1, 1991.
5. See id. at VI-3 to VI-4 (1992) (noting past and current Border Area conditions).
6. See generally Harry W. Ayer & Paul G. Hoyt, IndustrialGrowth in the U.S. Border
Communities and Associated Water and Air Problems: An Economic Perspective, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585 (1977) (warning of potential problems); Edwin H. Carpenter & Larry G.
Blackwood, The Potentialfor Population Growth in U.S. Counties that Border Mexico; El Paso
to San Diego, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 545 (1977) (explaining effect of population growth on
natural resources); Niles Henson, Economic Growth Patterns in the Texas Borderlands, 22
NAT. RESOURCES J. 805 (1982) (explaining how water availability will affect growth patterns);
Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of US-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093 (1982) (noting potential problems with
current treatment and status of groundwater).
7. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGIA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) A-6 to A-10 (1992) (outlining current agreements between the
United States and Mexico).
8. Id. at V- 12 (explaining role of each entity).
9. Id. at V-12 to V-13.
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proposed under existing Mexican-United States agreements."
Although the Plan makes general references to the Water Treaty of
1
1944, Minute 242, and the 1983 Border Environmental Agreement, 1
it is unclear as to the specific legal framework under which an entity
should shape a proposal. Such vagueness and reliance on the IBWC
may well be due to the lack of current treaty authority to engage in
more than an exchange of groundwater information.
This paper will explore the dilemma of implementing an appropriate legal format which would best guide proposals for resolution of
groundwater contamination. It will review groundwater under the
Plan, examine groundwater law in Mexico and the four border states
from a historical perspective, consider existing agreements between
the two countries relative to groundwater, and propose the adoption
of the Bellagio Draft Treaty as the only legally viable means of
achieving the long-term remedial groundwater solutions necessary
under the Plan. However, this paper will also note that isolated situations may be effectively addressed by the IBWC Minute, pending
treaty negotiation. The paper will argue that judicial and legislative
systems must recognize hydrological concepts that are fundamental to
sound, efficient management of groundwater as a national resource,
and will suggest that such an approach, when managed by the IBWC,
will not create needless havoc with 1944 Water Treaty allotments.
Finally, the paper will conclude that the Plan is a commendable, binational initial effort which addresses the delicate issue of managing
transboundary aquifers.
The legal dilemma of overlapping jurisdictions, compounded by underlying conflicting socio-economic concerns which now entrap
groundwater resolutions under the Plan, must be resolved by taking
the next step: establishing a treaty between the United States and
Mexico. To rely solely on existing agreements to avoid difficult political issues will result in a groundwater protection policy as effective as
that of the historical reliance on good fortune.
10. Id. Although the original draft of the Plan specifically stated that existing United
States-Mexican agreements should guide further action, the final version simply lists all legal
agreements between Mexico and the United States without comment. Id. at Annex A.
11. U. S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) V-12, A-6 to A-7 (1992).
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THE BORDER PLAN

A. Background
In the fall of 1990, amidst rising concern from legislators and the
public that environmental issues were being left far behind in the
haste to conclude a bilateral trade agreement on the "fast-track," 12
Presidents George Bush and Carlos Salinas de Gortari met in Monterrey to issue a joint communiqu6. It instructed the responsible environmental agency of the United States, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the responsible environmental agency of Mexico,
the Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE), to prepare
a comprehensive environmental plan which would "seek ways to improve coordination and cooperation, with a view to solving the problem of air, soil and water quality and hazardous waste." 13 Pursuant
to this command, the EPA and the SEDUE developed the Integrated
Environmental Plan for the Mexico-U.S. Border Area (First Stage,
1992-1994). 4 The Plan does not purport to examine the impact of
12. In 1985, Mexico and the United States signed a Statement of Intent to Negotiate a
Framework of Principles and Procedures Regarding the Trade and Investment Relations Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America (Apr. 23, 1985, U.S.Mex.). In 1987, a United States and a Mexican representative signed the Understanding Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning a Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultations Regarding Trade and Investment Relations, Nov.6, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 27 I.L.M. 439. On June 11,
1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas announced their intent to commence negotiations. See generally Guy C. Smith, The United States-Mexico FrameworkAgreement: Implicationsfor Bilateral Trade, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 655 (1989) (providing exhaustive treatment of
Framework Agreement). The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), made the fast-track procedures contained in that act applicable to
the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2110, and thereby to the free trade agreement.
13. See President George Bush & President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Joint Communiqu6
(Nov. 27, 1990), reprinted in U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICO-U.S.

BORDER AREA (FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) 1-1 (1992) (containing statement of Plan's goals).
The text of the joint communiqu6 reads:
The Presidents emphasized the need for ongoing cooperation in the area of environmental
protection. Both Presidents instructed the authorities responsible for environmental affairs of their countries to prepare a comprehensive plan designed to periodically examine
ways and means to reinforce border cooperation in this regard, based on the 1983 Bilateral Agreement. Such a mechanism should seek ways to improve coordination and cooperation, with a view to solving the problems of air, soil and water quality and of
hazardous wastes. State and municipal authorities of both governments and private organizations in both countries should participate in such tasks as appropriate. Id.
14. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER AREA
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the free-trade agreement upon environmental conditions at the border.15 Rather, it limits itself to the directive of the communique, summarizing existing border problems categorically and creating
generalized implementation plans. 16 Indeed, the Plan seeks to solve
Border Area pollution problems by strengthening "the basis for continuing cooperation between Mexico and the United States. . ... "
Accordingly, the Plan couches problems within the existing environmental institutional framework.1" In the case of water, the Plan cites
the Water Treaty of 1944,'9 which gave rise to the highly successful
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), 20 and
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) (1992) (presenting finalized version of original working draft issued
Aug. 1, 1991).
15. The final version of the Plan contains a section entitled "North American Free Trade
Agreement" in which it is stated that "to reduce or avoid potential adverse environmental
impacts of the NAFTA" the parties will proceed in separate negotiations.
Such adverse impacts are:
(1) negotiation of provisions in the NAFTA to limit or avoid potential adverse impacts
associated with liberalization of trade in goods and services, such as impacts relating to
pesticides and toxins in products, and
(2) cooperative arrangements and agreements between SEDUE and EPA to deal with
other environmental issues.
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y ECOLOGiA,
INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA (FIRST

STAGE, 1992-1994) I-5 (1992). It is further noted that regardless of the outcome of the
NAFTA, the Plan will be pursued. Id. Additionally, an interagency task force coordinated by
the Office of the United States Trade Representative with the assistance of the EPA released a
draft analysis of the possible environmental effects of the NAFTA, the NAFTA Environmental
Review Document in October 1991. Id. at 1-56. The review emphasized the need for the successful implementation of the Mexican-U.S. Border Environmental Plan. Id.
16. The Plan categorizes Border Environmental conditions into: Water; Hazardous
Materials and Hazardous and Municipal Solid Wastes; Pesticides; Contingency PlanningEmergency Response and Pollution Prevention. Id. at III-1 to 111-28. The Implementation
Plans are presented by geographic area for Water Quality, Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Wastes, Municipal Solid Waste and Air Quality. Id. at V-7 to V-43.
17. Id. at 1-3. Further objectives of the plan are also noted. See id. (including goals of
providing comprehensive plan, solving pollution problems, setting up system for periodic review, and encouraging government and private participation).
18. See id. at V-1 (referring to Agreement Between the United States and the United
Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area (1983 Border Environmental Agreement (La Paz Agreement)); id. at V-13 (noting agreement to develop programs under existing Mexican-United States agreements).
19. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande [1944 Water Treaty], Feb.
3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 25, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945). See generally
Kirsten J. Anderson, Note, A History and Interpretationof the Water Treaty of 1944, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 600 (1972) (outlining treaty background and controversial provisions).
20. See Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between
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IBWC Minute No. 242,21 as the vehicles for exchange of information
and consultation regarding border groundwater. 22 The Border Area
itself is defined as "an area 100 kilometers on each side of the interna23
tional boundary.
B.

Groundwaterin the Plan
1. Examination of Groundwater

Water issues are addressed in "Water Supplies,"'24 "Water Quality,"25 "Wastewater Treatment, ' 26 and Marine Environment, ' 27 with
groundwater addressed in the first three categories. 28 The thrust of
the groundwater discussion is the mounting bi-national concern with
the spread of contaminated waters:
In some regions of the Border Area, the waters that cross the boundary
or those that drain into or from the international rivers present unsuitable sanitary conditions attributable to the disposal of wastewaters in
those water courses. There is the related risk of pollution of transboundary groundwaters if proper management and treatment of wasteMexico and the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderlands, 19
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 109-22 (1986) (reviewing development of IBWC under Water Treaty

of 1944); see also Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary
Resource Management: The United States Section of the InternationalBoundary and Water
Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 663-76 (1990) (examining
organizational politics under the IBWC); Peter S. Smedresman, Comment, The International
Joint Commission (United States-Canada)and the InternationalBoundaryand Water Commission (United States-Mexico): Potentialfor Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 499, 504-17 (1973) (critiquing Mexican-United States relationship

under IBWC).
21. Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the
Colorado River, IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, Mex.-U.S., 24 U.S.T. 1971.
22. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) VI-3 (1992).

23. Id. at I-I (1992) (defining "Border Area" in same way as La Paz Agreement).
24. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) 11-I to 111-3 (1992).

25. Id. at 111-3 to 111-5.
26. Id. at 111-5 to 111-9. The Plan breaks down wastewater treatment by region: TijuanaSan Diego; Mexicali-Imperial County; Nogales-Nogales; Ciudad Juarez-El Paso; Nuevo
Laredo-Laredo; Bajo Rio Bravo-Lower Rio Grande. Id.
27. Id. at 111-9 to 111-12.
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) 111-2 to 111-5 (1992).
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water and hazardous wastes are not carried out. Mexico and the
United States are concerned about the adverse public health and environmental impacts associated with pollution of transboundary water
supplies.29
The water discussion reveals worry for the Mesilla and Hueco aquifers in El Paso County, Texas. Both aquifers are pumped heavily and
rely on recharge from the Rio Grande River and storage in the Rio
Grande alluvium.3" The report quietly notes: "The quality of the surface water in the Rio Bravo-Rio Grande and the quality of the
groundwater in storage in the river alluvium can have a significant
impact on the quality of the groundwater in the bolsons....
The report then continues with three observations: (1) "the quantity of groundwater available for agricultural purposes throughout the
Border Area could be adversely affected by significant industrial
growth"; (2) "widespread industrial growth and associated residential development in close proximity to El Paso County could create
high rates of groundwater withdrawal from the bolsons and result in
unacceptable groundwater quality degradation"; and (3) "extensive
groundwater pumping throughout the Border Area may lead to transboundary and surface subsidence problems. "32
2.

Impact of Untreated Wastewater, Hazardous Waste, and
Pesticides

The Plan names untreated wastewater, industrial wastes, and agricultural runoff, particularly in the Rio Grande region, as persistent
border problems.3 3 The Plan also describes the Rio Grande Valley
and the Imperial Valley of California as major agricultural producing
areas which use substantial quantities of pesticide on both sides of the
border. This pesticide use is potentially a "non-point source pollution
'34
of water bodies."

29. Id. at 111-3. The plan notes the recent rise of cholera in the Border Area. Id.
30. Id. at 111-2.
31. Id.
32. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S.

BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) 111-3 (1992).

33. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) 111-5 to 111-9 (1992).
34. Id. at 111-25. See generally id. at III (discussing pesticide use in Border Area).
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Moreover, the Plan cites a remarkable increase in documented
shipments of hazardous waste through Texas: from 9 shipments and
189.9 tons in 1987, to 356 shipments and 2388.5 tons in 1990. 3' The
EPA and the SEDUE suspect illegal storage and dumping on both
sides of the border, but they are uncertain as to the extent of such
activity.36 Both entities recognize that this flow of hazardous waste is
a potential contaminant of surface water and groundwater.37
3. Implementation Plan for Groundwater
Initially, both Mexico and the United States will monitor groundwater sources and collect data sufficient to identify problem areas.38
The Plan anticipates that data-gathering would have taken place in
1992, and that problem areas would be located in 1993. 39 The Plan
notes that the "first priority" is to identify contaminated and
threatened aquifers. 4 Surface and groundwater supplies will be addressed in an integrated fashion. The SEDUE, the CNA, and the
EPA through the IBWC will:
[develop] an inventory of the sources, quality, and treatment processes
of the existing drinking water... determine the priority needs for water
supply treatment and distribution systems for existing and future development in the sister city communities ...exchange information on surface and groundwater protection programs... identify areas where any
[drinking] water source is contaminated or where there is an identifiable
threat of contamination [and] . . . develop cooperative programs for
solving identified problems under existing Mexican-United States
agreements.41
Additionally, the general implementation provisions for "Effective
Protection of Transboundary Environmental Resources" states that
35. Id. at 111-20. The Plan seems to indicate the directional flow of the waste transported
is from Mexican maquiladora plants to United States plants. Id.
36. See id. at 111-19 to 111-23 (outlining concerns regarding contamination of Border
Area water sources).
37. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S.
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) 111-20 to 111-23 (1992).

38. U.S.

ENVTL.

BORDER AREA

PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO

ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S.

Y

BORDER AREA

1992-1994) V-12 (1992).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at V-13.

(FIRST STAGE,
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"policies to be applied for the protection of. . . transboundary aquifers" should have been announced by the IBWC in 1992.42 To date,
however, the IBWC has issued no transboundary aquifer policy.43
The Plan refers to existing Mexican-United States agreements, including the Water Treaty of 1944, the IBWC Minute No. 242, and the
1983 La Paz Agreement." The 1992 data-gathering and the 1993
identification of problem areas provided for in the Plan45 fall clearly
within the mandate of Minute 242 which authorizes information exchange on groundwater.46
As for the solutions to groundwater contamination, the Plan offers
ten site-specific implementation frameworks for wastewater.47 The
Plan is silent, however, as to what format the countries should use to
address other sources of contamination. The Plan merely states that
"enforcement actions by the proper agencies in each country" may be
undertaken, together with "international construction projects and
other cooperative solutions and preventive measures." 4 Left unanswered is the question of the actual mechanism by which to implement remediation efforts. Apparently, each government must work
within the context of existing Mexican-United States agreements, and
the proposed solutions must fit within the tangled jurisdiction of
groundwater.
As the Plan notes:
The Governments of Mexico and the United States are concerned about
42. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) V-49 (1992).
43. Telephone interview with Manual Ybarra, Secretary of the IBWC in El Paso, Tex.
(Dec. 1992) (confirming that no policies issued thus far).
44. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) Annex A (1992).

45. Id. at V-30.
46. Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the
Colorado River, IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, Mex.-U.S., 24 U.S.T. 1971. Minute
242, Section 6 provides:
With the objective of avoiding future problems, the United States and Mexico shall consult with each other prior to undertaking any new development of either the surface or the
groundwater resources, or undertaking substantial modifications of present developments,
in its own territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other country. Id.
47. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) V-14 to V-21 (1992).
48. Id. at V-12.
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adverse impacts on public health and the environment in border regions
where transboundary groundwaters may be contaminated or are
threatened by contamination. There is no existing groundwater treaty
between the two countries.... In the United States, EPA and the four
United States border states share jurisdiction over border groundwater
quality matters within their respective boundaries. In Mexico, SEDUE
and the National Water Commission (CNA) have corresponding

jurisdiction.4 9

Herein lies the thorniest legal problem before the Mexican and United
States governments. The governments must provide a framework for
resolving groundwater contamination. Such a framework must be
designed to consider the current sovereign rights over groundwater
possessed by each border state. The approach of each border state
varies because each state has adopted a legal doctrine which best suits
its own socio-economic circumstances. Thus, four legal regimes, including California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, now exist.
Although some aspects of groundwater have been regulated by federal statute incident to pollution control, ° the reach of these statutes
does not appear to provide the EPA with the necessary jurisdiction
suggested by the Plan. Such jurisdiction must include authority to
regulate pumping. Notwithstanding pollution-causation issues, it is
unlimited pumping that exacerbates the groundwater-contamination
problem. Pumping has traditionally been regulated within the statutory and common law framework of the individual states. Thus, without controlling federal legislation, jurisdiction of sovereign states
must be built into transboundary aquifer resolutions.
Although this pieced jurisdiction appears to be in stark contrast to
the entire cloth appearance of Mexican federal jurisdiction over
water, government regulation of pumping may create novel water
problems in Mexico. Mexico appears to be giving its border states
more power to enforce environmental laws. As in the United States,
the degree and type of enforcement may vary if left to state control.
Enforcement problems could be further exacerbated if both Mexican
49. Id.
50. Eight federal statutes contain provisions to protect groundwater: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act; Clean Water Act; Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; Safe Drinking
Water Act; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act; Toxic Substances Control Act; Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act. Additionally, the Endangered Species Act impacts
upon groundwater.
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and United States border states perpetuate the legal mythology concerning groundwater by partitioning surface and groundwater
through the application of legal terms derived from an age when underground water was considered a mysterious and perplexing natural
phenomenon. 5 1
C.

Hydrology and the Plan
1. Mass Balance

Hydrologists define "mass balance" as "the idea that inputs to the
hydrologic system from all sources are equal to outputs. ' ' 52 Despite
early efforts to separate surface and groundwater in a fumbling attempt to deal with its labyrinthal qualities, scientists now recognize
that the interrelationship between surface water and groundwater is
essential to groundwater management.5 3
2.

Hydrology in the Law

For the past sixty years, as water volumes have declined and pollution has remained uncontrolled, water law scholars have called for a
more harmonized approach to groundwater management. 54 Yet,
states cling to their historical doctrines, unwilling to consider what
modern science has revealed. Modern science now recognizes that the
mysterious nature of underground water is reducible in large part to
maps, flow charts, and mathematical calculation. In short, hydrology
has arrived.
In fairness to the legal systems, some scholars note that scientists
themselves have been heretofore ineffective apostles of comprehensive
water dogma.
Hydrology as a science has not been markedly successful in communi51. See George D. Cisneros, Texas Underground Water Law: The Need for Conservation
and Protectionof a Limited Resource, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 637, 639 (1980) (noting historical
views of nature of underground water).
52. W.P. Balleau, Water Appropriationand Transfer in a General Hydrogeologic System,
28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 269, 270 n.l (1988).
53. See Robert D. Hayton, The Ground Water Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy
Objectives and Management, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119, 119-24 (1982) (noting problems that
developed due to misunderstanding of interrelationship between water sources).
54. See Frank J. Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27 ROCKY

MTN.MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1856 (1982) (urging harmonized approach); Samuel C. Weil, Need
of Unified Lawfor Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 358, 369 (1929) (calling
for attention by attorneys, engineers, legislators, and voters).
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cating its basic principle, such as mass balance. A water policy study
team advising the New Mexico legislature concluded that "this concept
and its ultimate impact on the environment ...is little understood by
hydrologists and by people alike."5 5
Notwithstanding the dawn of enlightened hydrology among scientists, the law has continued to (1) perpetuate antiquated myths of
"underground streams," which are rarely actually found,5 6 (2) characterize "percolating water" as separable and, therefore, treat it as a
full sister to surface water, and (3) use the label "fugitive streams" as
opposed to "underground streams." 57 Historically, such approaches,
which may be generally summarized as giving water rights to the
landowner or the first user, developed as a direct consequence of
property rights. Today, however, the issue of property rights to water
must be joined to the larger public interest in safe drinking water.
Such waters face dissolution and contamination. Close examination
of the origins of state laws reveals that such laws, although effective
for over one hundred years, are inherently limited in approach and,
thus, are ineffective in addressing groundwater issues. This fact does
not indicate that property rights long-protected by the American legal
system should be abandoned. Rather, this fact reveals that the larger
public interest in water purity and availability should be integrated
into existing legal regimes.
3.

The Plan

Such considerations underlie the approach to groundwater contained in the Plan. The Plan's discussion of supplies of drinking water
considers agricultural pumping needs, as well as industrial and municipal growth projections.5 8 The groundwater implementation plan
55. W.P. Balleau, Water Appropriation and Transfer in a General Hydrogeologic System,
28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 269, 270 (1988) (commenting upon results of team study).
56. In Texas, such streams have never been found.
57. See Robert D. Hayton, The Ground Water Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy
Objectives and Management Requirements, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119, 122-28 (1982) (review-

ing groundwater legal history); Samuel C. Weil, Origin and Comparative Development of the
Law of Watercourses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 247
(1918) (describing judicial uncertainty regarding legal classification of water sources); Samuel
C. Weil, Theories of Water Law, 27 HARV. L. REV. 530, 530 (1914) (noting existence of differing legal theories underlying water law).
58. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA

(FIRST STAGE,

1992-1994) V-1 to V-3 (1992).
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specifically directs the United States and Mexico to take inventory of
drinking-water sources, a mandate which would require a complete
aquifer study. 9 This commendable integrated implementation plan
will likely require a response, from each border state and Mexico,
which will consider mass balance and drinking-water issues. Thus,
the legal framework for solving groundwater contamination may
force recalcitrant states to recognize hydrological principles.
D. InternationalGroundwater Law and the Plan
1. Overview
For over twenty years, legal scholars have been warning the public
of the looming environmental catastrophe if such voracious pumping
on both sides of the Mexican-United States border were to continue.'
As Professor Utton has remarked:
...significant population increases are projected on both sides of the
border, making it reasonable to anticipate that there will be increasing
pumping and accelerating demand placed on groundwater resources bisected by the international boundary between the two countries. This
increased demand, combined with a striking absence of institutions for
either resolving disputes or managing the resource, raises the specter of
59. Id. at V-12 to V-13.
60. See Neal E. Armstrong, Anticipating Transboundary Water Needs and Issues in the
Mexico-United States Border Region in the Rio Grande Basin, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 877,
877-906 (1979) (forecasting water needs in Rio Grande Basin); Michael D. Bradley & Kenneth
J. DeCook, Ground Water Occurrenceand Utilization in the Arizona-SonoraBorder Region, 18
NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 29-32 (1978) (considering water quality concerns along Arizona-Sonora border); Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G. Cornish, Needed: A Ground-Water Treaty
Between the United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 403-04 (1975) (calling for
cooperative solutions to preserve accessible water); J.C. Day, International Aquifer Management: The Hueco Bolson on the Rio Grande River, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 177 (1978)
(warning that long-term availability of high-quality water from Rio Grande threatened by
unsound management system); Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwater: New Resources Versus Old Dilemmas, 12 CASE WES. RES. J. INT'L L.
505, 515 (1980) (outlining concerns about IBWC's present mandate); Ernest T. Smerdon,
Water-Its Role from Now to the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 907, 909 (1982) (emphasizing importance of water quality and availability to transboundary region of Mexico and
United States); Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of US.-Mexican Water
Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1104 (1982) (examining
potential problems with surface water apportionment and quality, groundwater quantity and
quality, and possible conservation strategies); Albert E. Utton, International Ground Water
Management: The Case of the US.-Mexican Frontier,57 NEB. L. REV. 633, 649 (1978) (expressing concern for groundwater use in states contiguous to Mexico).
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dispute between the two countries.61

The anticipated free-trade agreement will indubitably increase development in the Border Area, placing further pressure on a situation

described as tenuous over ten years ago.6 2 Moreover, the critical

water pollution problems described in the Border Plan sharpen health
concerns over drinking water and socio-economic issues. Water-law
scholars have suggested various legal regimes to manage the groundwater resource.63 Mexican commentators have favored using the
IBWC to approach the problem, but have not elaborated as to which
legal theory should be followed. 6" These commentators have also
failed to indicate whether Mexico and the United States would more

comfortably address particular solutions for segregated areas rather
than a generalized solution for the entire region.
2.

Application of International Groundwater Law

With the laudable exception of New Mexico, legislators and the
judiciary have failed to integrate surface and groundwater. This fail-

ure is equally apparent in international groundwater law. As an out-

growth of the world-wide focus on environmental problems, the
relationship between the waters is being recognized gradually. 65 One

commentator who has been frequently cited for his statement on the
dearth of domestic groundwater statutes has noted that "legislative
attention to the physical relationship between surface and ground-

61. Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1107 (1982).
62. See id. (noting potential for serious water problems in Border Area).
63. See Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, TransboundaryGroundwater: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 664-65 (1989) (presenting framework for groundwater management).
64. See Edmundo Victoria Mascorra, Experiencia en el Manejo de Recurros de Agua
Compartidos Entre Mixico y Estados Unidos: Problemas, Oportunidadesy Recomendaciones
Para El Futuro, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1119, 1120 (1982) (suggesting that IBWC manage
groundwater problems); C6sar Sepulveda, Instituciones Para La Solucion de Problemas de
Aguas de Superficie Entre Mixico y los Estados Unidos, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 131, 139-40
(1978) (analyzing feasibility of IBWC'S ability to propose and enact solutions to United StatesMexico border water problems); C6sar Sepulveda, Implicationsfor the Future: Design of Viable InternationalInstitutions, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 215, 220 (1975) (explaining that IBWC
could be strengthened to better manage international waters).
65. See Ludwik A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution:
Survey and Trends in Treaty Law, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629, 632 (1979) (discussing relationship and differences between ground and surface water pollution).
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water sources is scarcely older than the concern for pollution."66 This
statement is equally applicable to the lack of common law and, ac-

cordingly, international law that recognizes the natural interdepen-

dence between surface water and groundwater. 67 Reliance upon

international groundwater law to resolve the major problems of pollution and scarcity, as recognized in the Plan, is cumbersome at best

and fruitless at worst, given the formulative stage of the law's
development.6 8
III.
A.

GROUNDWATER LAW IN THE SOUTHWEST

HistoricalPerspective
1. Native American Custom

The true natives of the border region revered water as crucial to
life. These early Native American tribes paid homage to deities such
as rain gods, rain lords, or rain magicians. 69 The great explorer,
Francisco Vasquez de Coronado noted in his diary in 1540:
So far as I can find out, these Indians worship water, because they say it
makes their maize grow and sustains their life and the only other reason
they know is that their ancestors did the same.7 °
Because of the pivotal role of water and rain in the lives of the
Native Americans and the sparse archaeological record, historians
suggest that water was not considered private property and that water
disputes were likely tribal or communal rather than individual. 7 1 In66. R. Clark, Western Ground-Water Law, 5 WATERS AND WASTE RIGHTS, § 440 at 411
(1972).
67. See Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiator Custom: The Checkered Development ofInternational

Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 69 (1991) (commenting on relationship between surface and groundwater). Professor Teclaff observes, "[t]he Helsinki Rules also implied, though
they did not specifically state, that groundwater and estuarine waters, as well as surface waters,
were interconnected through cause and effect and thus formed the basis for a holistic approach
in law and management of the aquatic environment. Id.
68. See Julio Barberis, The Development ofInternationalLaw of Transboundary Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 169 (1991) (providing recent review of international
groundwater law).
69. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 11 (1984).
70. Id. at 10 n.6 (quoting de Coronado as noted in HERBERT E. BOLTON, CORONADO:
KNIGHT OF PUEBLO AND PLAINS 131 (1964)).

71. See id. at 18 (noting tribal views of water). The Aztecs did not allow individual
control of land or water, merely their use. Id. at 18 n.26 (citing CARLOS H. ALBA, ESTUDIO
COMPARADO ENTRE EL DERECHO AZTECO Y EL DERECHO POSITIVO MEXICANO 40-41

(1944)).
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deed, most Native American religions followed the view that they
were part of the natural ecological balance and, as such, were to use
what was necessary to sustain life.72
The God of Rain, or Lord of the Waters, named Tlaloc, Cocio,
Tajin, Siiwani, Thunderbird,Tan-yi-ojua, Tzitz-cha-yan, or Chaac, depending upon the tribe, was displaced with the arrival of the
Spaniards and accompanying missionaries. 73 As the conquering
Spanish directed the ancient flows of Native American rivers with European irrigation methods, the natives found that their code of unwritten laws of reverence for waters had vanished. Suddenly, water
was distributed, and not to everyone. Indigenous Americans became
supplicants in the legal system of a far-away culture, a culture which
had clearly recognized the power to control water.74
2.

The Law of New Spain

a.

Origins

The northern frontier of New Spain encompassed more than
960,000 square miles, roughly all the area covered by the Border
Plan.75 To control water issues, the Spaniards applied Las Siete Partidas, a civil code compiled in 1265 under King Alfonso V. 76 The
Partidascode was derived from Roman law, although Moorish cus77
tom influenced its development.
Roman law shared the Native American belief that running water
was not the property of the individual. 7 By natural law, these elements are common to all-the air, running water, the sea, and, consequently, the seashore.7 1 "Res communes," which belonged to no one
72. Id. at 19.
73. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 9-10 (1984).
74. Id.; see id. at 3-104 (explaining relationship of water to society).
75. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 3 (1984) (describing
boundaries of New Spain).
76. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS DEL REY DON ALFONSO EL SABIO (1789) (consisting of four
volumes).
77. See BETTY DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 63-77 (1959)
(discussing water law and institutions of Spain).
78. See Samuel C. Weil, Theories of Water Law, 27 HARV. L. REV. 530, 530-40 (1917)
(presenting thorough history of water law ownership principle commonly referred to as "first
elemental principle"). See generally Samuel C. Weil, Origin and Comparative Development of
the Law of Watercourses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245
(1918) (setting forth historical theories of water law).
79. Harbert Davenport and J.T. Cerales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters, 8 BAYLOR L.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss3/1

18

Barber: The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater under the Integrated Environment

1993]

THE LEGAL DILEMMA OF GROUNDWATER

person, included fish, wild beasts, and the light and heat of the sun, as
well as running water. Running water was:
so classed because at one instant it is in one place in the river, then it is
gone and some other water has succeeded it, without anyone having
been able to say that he had it as his own; a thing of continual motion
and ceaseless change, not susceptible of exclusive possession, nor hence,
of ownership.80
The Romans then distinguished a right to water use which was recognized by civil law as a property right.8
The Partidasadopted the code of divisible things from the Romans
82
and accepted the concept that some things belonged to no person.
83
Included in this category were the air, rain, water, sea, and shores.
The Partidasfurther provided a groundwater provision that permitted
a landowner to dig a well or spring, even if this action reduced the
flow of a neighbor's well or spring.84
The Partidascode was supplemented in 1681 by the Recopilacidn de

REV. 138, 160 (1956) (citing Book II, Title I of the INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN: OF THE DIFFERENT KIND OF THINGS).
80. Id. at 159 (quoting SAMUEL C. WEIL, WATERS IN THE WESTERN STATES 748-50 (3d

ed. 1911)). As declared by the Romans:
... now let us proceed to the law of things. Of these, some admit of private ownership,
while others it is held, cannot belong to individuals: for some things are by natural law
common to all, some are public, some belong to a society or corporation, and some belong
to no one.

Things become the private property of individuals in many ways; for the titles by which
we acquire ownership in them are some of them titles of natural law, which, as we said, is

called the law of nations, while some are titles of civil law. It will thus be most convenient
to take the older law first: and natural law is clearly the older, having been instituted by
nature at the first origin of mankind, whereas civil laws first came into existence when
states begin to be founded, magistrates to be created, and laws to be written.
Id. at 160.
81. See BETTY E. DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 51 (1959)
(citing Roman law). Ms. Dobkins quotes Samuel C. Weil, as follows:
The water in the stream - in the natural resource - itself is nobody's property or "belongs to the public." The right may exist in one having a right of access to it to take of it
or otherwise use it (called usufructuary) and to have it flow to him for his use. Any part
taken in the fulfillment of this usufructuary right is the private property of the taker while
in his possession.

Id.
82. Partida 3, Titulo 28, Ley 2.

83. Id. Ley 3.
84. See BETTY E. DOBINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 77 (1959)
(noting Partidasprovisions).
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Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias.85 This set of laws was followed by a
compilation of laws and commentary, completed in 1805, entitled
Novzsma Recopilacidn de las Leyes de Espaffa.s6 At the end of the
colonial era, Spain recognized this compilation as its basic source of
law.7 To these compilations, water scholars add three more documents to complete the history of Spanish colonial water law: the
Reglamento General de las Medidas de las Aguas of 1761 (Regulations
for Water Measurement), the detailed instructions on implementation
of water law and resolution of disputes given to judicial officials in
1786, and the Plan de Pitic, the town plan of Hermsillo, whose water
88
provisions were to be enforced throughout the internal provinces.
Additionally, local laws and customs influenced water law. 89 At
least one scholar suggests that local water laws and customs were derived from the Moorish influence on the Spaniards, resulting in the
colonial concept that water belonged to the pueblo community. 90
b. Land-Water Rights in New Spain
In New Spain, the king or other properly designated authority delegated water rights. Land grants may or may not have included the
additional grant of water rights, 91 and land was classified and valued
dependent upon such rights. 92 A grant of land with river frontage
85. See RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS (Biox ed., 5th ed.

1841) (containing updated version in 4 volumes).
86. NOViSMA RECOPILACI6N DE LAS LEYES DE ESPANA (1805).
87. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 111 (1984).

The au-

thor also notes that some legal historians disagree as to its application to the Spanish empire in
America. Id.
88. Id. at 112 (listing three important documents of Spanish water law).
89. See id. at 112-113 (discussing importance of local legislation); see also BETTY
DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 81 (1959) (observing use of local

law and customs). Frederic Hall's work The Laws of Mexico quotes extensively from the
scholar Joaquin Esriche y Martin, author of Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia (1831). Hall's work, including Esriche's treatment of water law, is often quoted in
cases, especially in Texas. See BETTY DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER
LAW 77-84 (1959) (discussing Esriche's interpretation of Spanish water law).
90. See BETTY DOBKINs, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 83 (1959)

(discussing the impact of the Moors).
91. See BETTY DOBKINs, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 130 (1959)

(discussing whether water rights were included in land grant); cf. MICHAEL C. MEYER,
WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 126-27 (1984) (stating that certain lands did not carry
with them implied grant of water).
92. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 122-26 (1984) (listing

examples of classifications of land depending on water rights granted).
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gave the owner use for domestic purposes only. 93 Springs or wells
belonged to the property-owner. 94 Determining whether a grant of
land over subsurface water also included a grant of the water was
more difficult. One commentator explains this difficulty as follows:
The district ownership pattern between surface and subsurface water is
not easy to explain. Water originating from rain was considered common property, but knowledge of aquifers was very rudimentary. Maybe
the water in springs and wells came from subterranean sources; maybe
it had always been there; the supply certainly seemed limitless. There
was little or no appreciation that underground water also originated
from precipitation, or that depleting an underground reserve on a given
piece of property could have a direct impact on the water supply of a
neighbor. Given this imperfect understanding, a person could pump
water from a well or channel springwater to his fields without special
permission. The only limitation on the use of water originating on private property was that it could not be used maliciously simply to deny
its access to a neighbor.9 5
c.

Ownership of Water Rights

The Crown could grant water rights. However, such rights were
often acquired through the administrator of the legal system, by use
of composicidn 96 or repartimento.97 This latter method, although
apparently intended to protect the Native
American population, 98 was

93. Id. at 120 (allowing Crown to dispose of water right at will).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 120 n.23 (citing Partida 3, Titulo 32, Ley 19). Meyer observes that: "In 1674
French scientist Pierre Perrault established that springs were fed by earthly precipitation, not
by some wondrous subterranean source, but the discovery never quite caught up with Spanish
jurisprudence." Id. at 120 n.22.
96. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 134-35 (1984). Composicidn was a judicial method used to examine claims and render clear titles. As noted:
The composicidn was an important legal mechanism which helped water users whose legitimate rights were called into question because of the failure to meet some insignificant
legal technicality. But they were also a source of abuse as they could be used by the
affluent and affluential to blur distinctions between crop land and grazing land and to
convey water rights for purposes not originally intended.
Id.
97. Id. at 135-36.
98. Concern for Indian rights in peninsular Spain prompted the Audiencia, the governing
body of Spain to amend the Recopilacidn to require that waters of estates were to be common
to Indians and Spaniards; eight years later this was broadened to provide that "waters" of the
provinces "be common to all citizens." The concern stemmed from the Crown's grant to
Hernn Cortes, the conqueror of Mexico, of large pieces of land, including rights "to running,
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used in all water disputes as the basis for dividing available water.
The Recopilacidn stated: "We decree that the audiences name judges
.. . who shall apportion waters to the Indians for the irrigation of
their farms, orchards, and cultivated fields, and to water their cattle,
in such a way as to offend no one." 99
The apportioned rights to the water were not permanent and frequently were readjudicated, but failure to abide by a decision resulted
in penalties, fines, or a loss of water rights.lI° Rivers became common
property until they were privatized by grant, composicidn, or recopilacidn. Such rights were subject to sale. The result was the growth of
sobrante rights, which were contracts between individuals for the primary owner's excess water. This permitted sales of sobras, often unwritten agreements between neighbors that were recognized and
protected by local judicial authorities. Usage of the water established
the relationship between primary and sobrante rights."' 1
Scholars disagree over whether Native Americans received different
water rights or different treatment under the Spanish legal system.' °2
In the Recopilacidn and aforementioned relevant documents, the repeated stipulation that Native Americans not be denied water use
may be viewed as further attempts by fair-minded persons to apply
the long-standing water principle of Spanish law, that all have the
13
right to use the river.

1

When title was unclear, the doctrine of prior use or prior appropriation was applied. This concept was applied tentatively, however,
particularly when water was scarce. As Esriche noted in his
Diccionario:
stagnant and percolating waters." This occurred at the height of public outcry in Spain over
the possible mistreatment and enslavement of Indians in the New World. See In re Adjudication of Waters Rights, 670 S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Tex. 1984) (using Recopilacidn de Las Leyes de
Las Indias to determine Mexican law); see also State of Texas v. Valmont Plantations, 346
S.W.2d 502, 589 (1963) (discussing history of Mexican water law).
99. Recopilaci6n, Libro IV, Titulo 17, Ley 5.
100. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 136 (1984).

101. See id. at 140 (discussing nature of sobrante rights). "Sobrante rights were so thoroughly ingrained in the Spanish colonial and Mexican judicial systems that the concept was
adopted by United States courts and applied to water disputes in those territories ceded to the
United States at the end of the Mexican War." Id.
102. See BETTY DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 93 (1959)
(discussing difference between Spanish and Native American systems of landholding); cf.
MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 140-44 & n.48 (describing view

of Mexican scholars).
103. Id. at 140-44.
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Use is the custom, general practice, or modus operandi that has been
imperceptibly introduced and has acquired the force of law. Prior use is
founded on the tacit consent of the public that observes it, of the courts
that conform to it, and the legislator that permits its application....
Prior use contrary to reason or to good custom can never acquire the
force of law, because in such a case it can be considered no more than
an old mistake, being less a use than an abuse and an infraction of the
law. 1'
Despite recognizing individual water rights, the colonial legal system elevated communal water rights and rescinded individual water
rights if it was in the best interests of the pueblo.° 5 As Betty Dobkins
notes:
It is important in considering the Spanish system to bear in mind that
its primary concern was with the common use of waters, with their administration in such a fashion that the community interests were served
and the fertility of the land preserved, rather than with prior and exclu-

sive rights. 106

The judges were encouraged by legal documents, !0 7 many governors, I10 as well as by the ancient tenet of water for all, to apply the
doctrine of equity and common good. Although the interpretation of
statutes and legal documents was central to the Spanish system, the
judicial function, which included recognition of custom, permitted the
balancing of interests fundamental to equity.I0 9 Despite the elaborate
trappings of a civil law system, the fundamental principle of "water

104. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 150 (1984) (citing
ESRICHE, DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACI6N 686).

105. See id. at 156-57 (illustrating that the community rights outweighed individual
rights); see also BETTY DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 98-101
(1959) (discussing the superiority of common water rights).
106. BETTY DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 98 (1959).
107. "The Plan of Pitic based its entire water distribution formula on the principles of
'equity and justice.'" MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 163
(1984) (citing Plan de Pitic, article 20, AGN, Tierras, vol. 2773, Exp. 22).
108. Id. at 162-63 (discussing governor of New Mexico's ordered equitable water
distribution).
109. See id. at 161-63 (citing examples of litigants who had legal right to water but compromises were worked out permitting all parties some relief). This approach followed the
Roman system of water law, whereby rights were protected but needs were addressed. See
BETTY DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 56-57 (1959) (showing

Roman law contributions to modern water law); Samuel C. Weil, Origin and Comparative
Development of the Law of Water Courses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CAL. L.
REV. 245, 254-55 (1918) (discussing interpretation of Roman doctrines).
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for all," which dates back to early civilizations, was to be applied in a
just fashion, overriding notions of rights inherent in property
ownership.
B.

GroundwaterLaw in Mexico Today
1. Constitution

Having established independence from Spain in 1821, New Spain
endured nearly a century of changes in government and boundaries. 110 Throughout this period, however, the basic approach to water
rights did not change. Indeed, following the last revolution, the Constitution embodied the concept of the commonality of water and the
attendant need to subjugate property rights to accommodate that
need. Article 27 provides: "Ownership of the lands and waters
within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in
the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transfer title thereof
to private persons, thereby constituting private property." ' This
right of private ownership is, however, subject to limitation by the
federal government.
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right
to regulate the utilization of natural resources which are susceptible to a
more equitable distribution of public wealth, to attain a well-balanced
of the living conditions of
development of the country and improvement
12
population.'
urban
the rural and
As to underground water, the Constitution further specifically
provides:
Underground waters may be brought to the surface by artificial works
and utilized by the surface owner, but if the public interest so requires
or use by others is affected, the Federal Executive may regulate its extraction and utilization, and even establish prohibited areas, the same as
may be done with other waters in the public domain. 1 '
110. See generally T.R. FEHRENBACH, FIRE AND BLOOD: A HISTORY OF MEXICO
(1973) (presenting Mexico's historical background); J. PATRICK McHENRY, SHORT HISTORY
OF MEXICO (1962) (noting changes in Mexican government and its form).
111. MEX. CONST. art. 27. (amended 1983).

112. Id. art. 27, § 3 (amended 1983).
113. Id. art. 27, § 5. Article 27, Section 5 amended in April 21, 1945 and January 20,
1960 by decrees published in the Diario Official (D.O.).
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Water Statutes

Pursuant to Article 27, in 1934 Mexico passed the National Water
Act (La Ley Federal de Aguas) which specifies priorities for water
utilization.114 The subsequent Health Engineering Act of 1947 placed
water-delivery systems within the exclusive power of the federal government. 15 The Law of Conservation and Groundwaters of 1956 (La
Ley de Conservacidn del Suelo y Agua) "established a system of restricted zones and a permit system to regulate the development of
groundwaters."116
The Secretariat of Agriculture and Water Resources (SARH) functions as the central administrator of water resources,II 7 and regulates
groundwater operation of filter works, waterways, and irrigation systems. The SARH has the authority to establish prohibited groundwater zones to protect existing groundwater zones or aquifers if it
finds that such measures are in the public interest.' 18 In so doing, the
SARH must follow the order of priorities for water set by the Federal
Executive. Nine uses are listed, with first priority given to domestic
use, consistent with the federal law of water.'19 These uses also explicitly recognize the right of the state and communities to private
property rights. 120 This insistent recognition by Mexico's federal government of the historical, national character of water and equitable
water rights, has resulted in a flexible management system of water
resources, subject always to the imperative that planning and development be "sujeta los intereses superiores de la nacidn" (subject to the

114. See Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters:
Some Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 518 (1980)
(explaining Mexican constitutional provision).
115. Id.
116. Id. Although currently limited, this water managed system may be expanded consistent with national policy objectives. Id.
117. See Francisco Oyarzabal, Comentariosa las Leyes e Instituciones Que Reglamentan
Las Aguas Superficiales de Mexico, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 999, 1005 (1982) (explaining structure of Mexican institutions).
118. Albert E. Utton, International Groundwater Management: The Case of the US.Mexican Frontier, 57 NEB. L. REV. 633, 634 (1978); see Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G.
Cornish, Needed: A Groundwater Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 392 (1975) (listing purposes of SARH).
119. Francisco Oyarzabal, Comentarios a las Leyes e Instituciones Que Reglamentan Las
Aguas Superficiales de Mexico, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 999, 1002 (1982).
120. Oyarzabal lists the fourth priority as: "Riego de terrenos;y dentro de dste es prioritarioel ejido y terrenos comunales sobre la propriedadprivada." Id.
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best interests of the nation). 2 '
Thus, the government has been acutely aware of the importance of
both surface water and groundwater to the people and the economy.
In the 1970s, the SARH undertook examinations of groundwater hydrology in Mexico, with emphasis on the border states, in an attempt
to take inventory of sources and increase exploratory activities. 122 As
Mumme pointed out over a decade ago:
The importance of groundwater to the Mexican border economy, particularly agriculture, and the concomitant importance of the regional
economy to the Mexican nation at large, suggest that the strategic significance of the development of groundwater resources in the area may
loom much larger from the Mexican perspective than from that of the
United States. That this is the case is evident in the recent large scale
pumping programs initiated by the Mexican government in the region ....

The evidence suggests the Mexican planners, endowed with

the legal and administrative resources to pursue a rational strategy of
groundwater development, will seek to take full advantage of the resource to promote the economic strength and growth of their border
economy. 123
The majority of commentators concur that groundwater management
is firmly in the control of the Mexican government.1 24 More impor121. Id. at 1004.
122. See Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters: Some Institutional and Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 520
(1980) (noting past action of SARH).
123. Id. at 519-20.
124. See Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G. Cornish, Needed: A Groundwater Treaty
Between the United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 385 (1985) (noting that
Mexico alone cannot solve groundwater problems); Stephen P. Mumme, The US.-Mexican
Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters. Some Institutionaland Political Considerations,
12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 518 (1980) (commenting on Mexican government's authority); Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of US.-Mexican Water Resources.:
Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1107 (1982) (noting that Mexico has
authority to control groundwater withdrawals). But see Robert D. Hayton, InstitutionalAlternativesfor Mexico-US. GroundwaterManagement, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 207-08 (1978)
(noting institutional limitations to withdrawing groundwater). Hayton suggests the Constitution merely protects surface water. "Inasmuch as the 1917 Constitution of Mexico did not
identify ground waters among the waters that were declared to be the property of the nation,
the owner of the overlying land still has title to 'his' ground water and the national power is
limited." Id. at 203. The author carefully conditions this statement by noting that he does not
,.attempt... to be specific about the groundwater legal or administrative regimes in Mexico."
Id. at 203 n.6. The significance of Professor Hayton's statement, contrary to other commentators, is that Mexico may have difficulty regulating pumping. This problem is one of jurisdiction similar to that in the United States.
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tantly, the deeply ingrained view of the Mexican people towards water
as belonging to all, and the subsequent transfer of control of water to
the federal government, makes water questions issues of national significance, readily vociferously addressed by a passionate public. 2 '

3. Environmental Statutes and Water
The first major environmental statute of Mexico, the Federal Law
for Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution, was passed in

Pursuant to this statute, the Regulations for the Prevention
and Control of Water Contamination 27 were issued, consisting of sev1971.126

enty articles. The Regulations gave power to the General Health
Council for issuance of regulations to prevent and control water pollution. Such regulations are to be enforced through the Secretariat of
Health and Assistance (SSA) in collaboration with the SARH. 2 8 Ten
years later, the Federal Law of Environmental Protection (LFPA)
was passed, the third chapter of which (Articles 21-28) was devoted to
water pollution. 2 9 Three years later, the General Health Law was
passed, and the Secretariat of Health and Assistance became the Secretariat of Health. Additionally, the SEDUE was created 30 for environmental protection. In 1988, these laws were superseded by the
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protec-

125. As Mumme thoughtfully states:
...such policy goals, involving issues of national patrimony, are ordinarily politicized
and symbolic. Mexico's historical relationship with the United States, and its nationalistic and personalist form of government, practically insure that such issues will be prominently featured in Mexican politics.
Stephen P, Mumme, The US.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters."Some Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. Irr'L L. 505, 520 (1980).
126. Federal Law for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution, D.O.,
Mar. 23, 1971. This statute was broad-based, including measures for air, water, and soil contamination. Id.
127. Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Water Contamination, D.O., Mar. 24,
1973.
128. See Charles T. Dumars & Salvador Beltran Del Rio, A Survey of the Air and Water
Quality Laws of Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 787, 803 (1988) (providing more detailed
explanation of Regulations). The Mexican government shortly thereafter created within SSA
the Subsecretariat for Environmental Improvement (SMA) as a control agency whose goal was
to coordinate actions of other agencies, plan environmental improvement projects, and enforce
the law. Id. at 790.
129. See id. (describing LFPA). LFPA also recognized the force of other civil statutes,
such as the Federal Water Law and the General Health Law. Id.
130. See id. (explaining organization of SEDUE).
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tion (General Ecology Law),13 ' which provides for protection of natural resources, as well as the prevention of pollution. Regulations must
be promulgated to implement the comprehensive general policy and
criteria of the statute. Although Mexico failed to issue broad-based
regulations for the 1972 legislation, and issued no regulations for the
1982 statute, it has issued four regulations under the 1988 legislation. 32 The Border Plan indicates that the Mexican government expects shortly to issue "a new regulation dealing with the prevention
and control of water pollution."' 1 33 The regulations are implemented
through the issuance of technological standards (NTEs) and ecological criteria. Ecological water standards have been and continue to be
34
drafted. 1
The General Health Law, cited by the Plan as empowering the Secretariat of Health to issue water quality standards, 3 ' specifically prohibits "the discharge of residual water or contaminants into any
surface or undergroundbody of water which may be for human use or
36
consumption." 1
It would thus appear that Mexico has begun to create a statutory
and regulatory framework within which to protect water as a national
resource for the benefit of its people. Mexico's actions are consistent

131. General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection, D.O., 1988.
132. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO
Y ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994), Annex A, A-I (1992) (noting regulations). Mexico has issued regulations concerning national air pollution, air pollution in Mexico City, hazardous wastes, and
environmental impact statements. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. As of November, 1990, fifty-seven technical ecological standards (NTEs) and
ecological criteria have been issued to implement the regulations. Since then, the SEDUE has
also approved several additional NTEs involving source categories for water. Id.
135. Id.
In accordance with the General Health Law in Mexico, the Secretariat of Health sets
water quality standards for human use and consumption, as well as standards relating to
treatments for water disinfection, and performs monitoring and certification of drinking
water quality. A national system to monitor and certify water has been established and is
applicable throughout Mexico.
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y ECOLOGiA
INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA (FIRST

STAGE, 1992-1994) Annex A, A-2 (1992). The SEDUE, the National Water Commission
(NWC) created under the SAH, and the Secretariat of Health are concerned with water quality standards. Id.
136. Charles T. Dumars & Salvador Beltran Del Rio M., A Survey of the Air and Water
Quality Laws of Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 787, 801 (1988).
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with the nation's long-held ideal that water is a cherished community
good.
C.

The Border States and GroundwaterLaw

1. California
a. Lack of Statutory Base
Experts have declared that California pumps more groundwater
than any other state. 37 Yet, California has no comprehensive statutory framework for control of groundwater. Although some water
districts have instituted groundwater management programs,138 California has not enacted a state-wide permit system. As a policy matter,
experts frequently quote the scholar Frank Trelease's characterization
of the California solution: "if you have a water problem, pour water
on it and it will go away."' 39 This statement refers to the tendency of
Californians to recharge aquifers with imported water or surface
water following pumping, generally for irrigation. Northern Californians, preferring groundwater management to development and exportation of that region's water, have long lobbied for state-wide
control. 140
Although comprehensive state groundwater legislation has been repeatedly proposed in California, such legislation has not gained sufficient political support for enactment.' 4 1 Conversely, local legislation
designed to deal with overdrafting of groundwater basins has success137. Gary Weatherford, et al., CaliforniaGroundwaterManagement: The Sacred and the
Profane, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1031, 1031 (1982).
138. See id. at 1035-36 (describing management system employed by Orange County
Water District of Southern California).
139. Id. at 1039 (citing Frank J. Trelease, Legal Solutions to Groundwater Problems-A
General Overview, 11 PAC. L.J. 863, 865 (1980)).
140. See Gary Weatherford, et al., California Groundwater Management: The Sacred
and the Profane, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1031, 1041 (1982) (explaining approaches used in
Northern California). Referendums pitting Southern Californians against Northern Californians have resulted in a lack of state control. Id.
141. See Ronald B. Robie & Patricia R. Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A
Ground Water Storage Program for the California State Water Project, 11 PAC. L.J. 41, 51
(1979) (noting that ground water legislation has been debated but that actual enacted legislation is sparse). In 1913, the California Conservation Commission, while drafting the permit
and license system of surface waters, recommended a similar groundwater treatment. Id.
Deemed too "vast" a task, the recommendation failed to pass. Id. Subsequent legislative efforts in 1917, 1923, 1953, and 1961 all met with defeat. Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank-A Case Study, 19 PAC. L. 1225, 1254-55 (1988)
(outlining attempts by California to adopt legislation).
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fully limited pumping and prohibited exportation of groundwater. 142
Moreover, in Orange County, the water district combined water importation with a reduction in pumping to replenish seriously depleted
area water levels.' 4 3 A pump tax was also introduced, which a
number of counties adopted.'" However, in those regions where a
basin overlaps many counties, jurisdictional difficulties have arisen.' 45
This concept of local control of groundwater was recognized as the
favored view by the Governor's Commission on Water Rights. 14 6 The
Commission Report gave local agencies primary authority to deal
with groundwater problems and suggested that the state take action
only if the local government failed to act. 47 The political resistance
to generalized groundwater legislation in California has been largely
regarded as an insurmountable barrier to comprehensive groundwater
management. 148 This political obstacle suggests that localized control
over groundwater in California will continue to garner the support of
the public and lawmakers.
California does have broad policy provisions relating to groundwater in existing state legislation.' 49 To date, these Water Code sections have not been the basis of any statewide action.
Moreover,
142. See Russell Kletzing, Imported GroundwaterBanking: The Kern Water Bank-A

Case Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225, 1261 (1988) (stating that four county ordinances and two state
laws enacted to prevent exportation of groundwater).

143. See id. at 1259-61 (discussing program of Orange County Water District).
144. See id. at 1260 (discussing pump tax implemented in Bakersfield).
145. See id. at 1262 (noting possible conflicts).
146. See Russell Kletzing, Imported GroundwaterBanking: The Kern Water Bank-A
Case Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225, 1255 (citing GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT (1978)).
147. See id. at 1254-55 (reporting mandatory administration of plan by state or local
agencies); Michael P. Mallery, Comment, Groundwater: A Callfor a Comprehensive Management Program, 14 PAC. L.J. 1279, 1279 (1983) (noting findings in Commissioner's report).
148. See generally Barbara T. Andrews & Sally K. Fairfax, Groundwaterand Intergovern-

mental Relations in the Southern San Joaquih Valley of California: What Are All These Cooks
Doing to the Broth?, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 145 (1984) (explaining attitudes toward ground-

water use and growing desire for state and federal involvement); Zachary A. Smith, Rewriting
California GroundwaterLaw: Past Attempts and Prerequisitesto Reform, 20 CAL. W. L. REV.

223 (1984) (describing efforts to implement groundwater legislation).
149. See Cal. Water Code §§ 104-05 (West 1971) (declaring California's interest in its
water use and providing for state management). These provisions recognize the authority of

the states to control surface or underground water for public protection or for the greatest
public benefit. Id.
150. See Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank-A
Case Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225, 1258-59 (1988) (stating that consideration being given to filing

action in San Gabriel Basin).
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the principal state water quality control statute, the Porter-Cologne
Act, provides only limited regulatory authority to protect groundwater quality threatened by changes in quantity or flow. 5 '
b.

A Mixed Legal Doctrine

California has used the doctrine of prior appropriation and correlative rights to govern surface water, which is now regulated by the
State Water Resources Control Board. 5 2 Groundwater rights have
been interpreted largely by the doctrine of correlative rights, although
commentators have confused the issue by noting a patchwork of doctrines including appropriative rights, mutual prescription, and equitable apportionment.'5 3
Although California has taken the position that the superadjacent
landowner has the rights to groundwater, it has limited "the landowner's use to amounts that he can beneficially use on his own land,
subject to the corresponding ('correlative') rights of other landowners
using the same underground aquifer."' 54 The prior appropriation
doctrine is applied, however, if the water is to be used elsewhere.1 55
Such rights are subordinate to the overlying owner's rights. In overdraft situations, all owners and appropriators are deemed to have acquired prescriptive rights against one another, hence the doctrine of
mutual prescription.' 5 6
Formulas based on quantities pumped over the past five years were
generally agreed upon in adjudications as elements of prescriptive
rights. The basins were subject to "safe yield determinations for the
basin."' 5 7 Recent cases have eliminated this automatic approach
where public users are involved, applying instead equitable apportion-

151. See Andrew H. Sawyer, State Regulation of Groundwater Pollution Caused By
Changes in GroundwaterQuality or Flow, 19 PAC. L.J. 1267, 1271-82 (1988) (reviewing limitations of statute).
152. See generally Gary Weatherford, et al., CaliforniaGroundwaterManagement: The
Sacred and the Profane, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1031 (1982) (discussing role of California
regulators).
153. See id. at 1033 (discussing complexity of California groundwater law).
154. Robert D. Hayton, The Ground Water Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy Objectives and Management Requirements, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119, 125 (1982).
155. Id.
156. See Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank-A
Case Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225, 1227 (1988) (discussing doctrine of mutual prescription).
157. Id.
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ment.'5 8 The "safe yield" concept continues to be upheld.15 9

c. Mexico-California Groundwater Basins
The Colorado Rivers and the Tijuana River provide groundwater
basins shared by California and Mexico. Pumping is occurring on
both sides of the border, causing increased salt intrusion, overdrafting, land subsidence, and poor water quality. To date, no agreements
on pumping exist between the United States and Mexico relating to
the California-Mexico pumping problem.
2. Arizona
a. Statutory Base
Groundwater has been called the "lifeblood" of Arizona agriculture. 1" Accordingly, threatened by dangerous overdrafting of underground reserves and the loss of federal funding for a massive water
project,16 1 the Groundwater Study Commission, comprised of legislators and representatives of water interests, proposed a bill adopted by
the legislature in 1980.162 The bill, the Arizona Groundwater Management Act (GMA), creates Active Management Areas (AMAs) in
158. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298 (1975)
(describing factors considered in equitable apportionment).
159. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (1949) (discussing concept of safe yield). Safe yield has largely been ignored in unadjudicated situations. Russell
Kletzing, Imported GroundwaterBanking: The Kern Water Bank-A Case Study, 19 PAC.
L.J. 1225, 1228 (1988).
160. Jeffrey Gross, Comment, Transboundary Water Quantity: The Effect ofArizona and
Mexican Groundwater Law on Arizona's Agriculture, 5 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 189, 189
(1988). Arizona uses 78% of its water resources for agriculture. Id.; see Robert Emmet Clark,
Overview of Groundwater Law at Institutions in US. Border States, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J.
1007, 1012-14 (1982) (assessing groundwater law on United States-Mexico border). See generally Robert Emmet Clark, Institutional Alternatives for Managing Groundwater Resources:
Notes for a Proposal, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 153 (1978) (providing alternative proposal for
managing groundwater on the United States-Mexico border).
161. One commentator has suggested that Arizona's passage of groundwater legislation
eliminating groundwater mining was politically required by the Carter Administration in exchange for funding for the construction of the Central Arizona Project. Desmond D. Connall,
Jr., A History of the Arizona GroundwaterManagement Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 329.
162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-411 (1987). See Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because
That's Where the Water Is": Retiring Current Water Users to Achieve the Safe-Yield Objective
of the Arizona GroundwaterManagement Act, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1991) (discussing
development of legislation and GMA). See generally Desmond D. Connall, Jr., A History of
the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313 (presenting history of
GMA); Jon L. Kyl, The 1980 Arizona GroundwaterManagement Act: From Inception to Current Constitutional Challenge, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 471 (1982) (reviewing GMA); Philip R.
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the four critically depleted regions of Tucson, Phoenix, Prescott, and
Pinal. 16 3 In AMAs, farmers must have irrigated land within the past
five years by pumping to continue this practice. 164 No new acreage
may be irrigated. Groundwater rights are also subject to a credit and
trading program by farmers. 165 Pumped water is measured to control
"actual beneficial use."1 66 The GMA's objective is to conserve water.
The GMA operates like a ratchet and moves only in one direction: controlling water use. The Act provides for DWR [Department of Water
Resources] to develop a series of Management Plans that, over time,
ideally will reduce the quantity of water used. Within AMAs, the Act
prohibits irrigating new lands, encourages a shift from irrigation to less
consumptive non-irrigation uses, and prohibits a shift from non-irriga1 67
tion use to irrigation.
Within the AMAs, the GMA protects existing irrigation uses. 168 The
AMAs are subject to permit requirements, and consumption is monitored. However, in other areas of the state, the common-law doctrine
169
of reasonable use continues to be applied to groundwater pumping.
The GMA has been severely criticized for protecting existing users
while advocating a safe-yield policy. 170 The conflict between the agriculture sector and urban developers has forced the state to begin to
examine the true impact of farming on the state's economy in relation

Higdon & Terence W. Thompson, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Code, 1980
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621 (setting forth background of GMA).
163. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-411 (1987). Sixty-nine percent of the state's total

overdraft and over 80% of the state's population are within the AMAs. Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is": Retiring Current Water Users to Achieve the SafeYield Objective of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 90 n.2
(1991).
164. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-465(A) (Supp. 1992).
165. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-467 (Supp. 1990); see Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is".- Retiring Current Water Users to Achieve the Safe-Yield
Objective of the Arizona GroundwaterManagement Act, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 97 (1991) (criticizing these two programs as frustrating purpose of Act).
166. Robert E. Clark, Overview of Groundwater Law and Institutions in United States
Border States, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1007, 1013 (1982).
167. Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is" Retiring Current
Water Users to Achieve the Safe- Yield Objective of the Arizona GroundwaterManagement Act,
33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 91 (1991).

168. See id. at 104 (explaining that existing irrigation uses have grandfathered
protection).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 105 (noting that GMA's effect inherently inconsistent with objective).
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to the amount of water farmers consume for irrigation.171 Because
the farmers produce hay and cotton, as opposed to foodstuffs, water
scholars suggest that the farmers should give up some water for other
public uses. 11 2 Water allocation in Arizona will continue to present
intra-state conflicts among competing economic interests,
as well as
conflicts between commercial and municipal users. 173
b.

Doctrine of Reasonable Use

Arizona has long recognized the common law doctrine of reasonable use, permitting a landowner to enjoy the right to water below his
land and pump such water as he or she could reasonably and beneficially use. 174 While pumpers within AMAs are subject to beneficial-

use standards, the more vague standard of reasonable use, which can
inherently lead to the abuse of other's rights, continues to be applied

elsewhere in the state. As Professor Clark remarked on the need for a
groundwater statute:
It became necessary as a result of a series of court decisions that exposed what the "reasonable use" rule had encouraged for years, viz.,
unreasonableuses including withdrawals far beneath Indian
and federal
175
and state public lands producing an enormous overdraft.

Despite passage of the GMA, the Arizona Supreme Court has described Arizona water law as "a bifurcated system in which percolating groundwater is regulated under a set of laws completely distinct
171. See Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is": Retiring Current Water Users to Achieve the Safe- Yield Objective of the Arizona GroundwaterManagement
Act, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 101-05 (1991) (setting forth role of agriculture in Arizona economy
and conflicts with developers); id. at 102-03 n.75-78 (presenting statistical data).
172. See id. at 101-105 (analyzing water allocation); see also Gary C. Woodward & Elizabeth Checchio, The Legal Frameworkfor Water Transfers in Arizona, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 721,
728-38 (1989) (setting forth water transfer strategies); Ellen K. Wheeler, Note, The Right to
Use Groundwater in Arizona After Chino Valley II and Cherry v. Steiner, 25 ARIZ. L. REV.
473, 475-84 (1983) (presenting approaches to water distribution as affected by common law).
173. See generally William Parsons & Douglas Mathews, The Californiazationof Arizona
Water Politics, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 341 (1990) (reviewing water practices vis-i-vis political
processes in California and Arizona).
174. See Bristor v. Cheatham, 255 P.2d 173, 178 (Ariz. 1953) (explaining doctrine of
reasonable use).
175. Robert Emmet Clark, Overview of Groundwater Law and Institutions in United
States Border States, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1007, 1013 (1982). Clark observes that such
exploitation resulted in judicial action which further encouraged the legislature to enact the
GMA. Id.
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from the laws regulating surface water."' 76 The impact of groundwater upon surface water continues to cause the courts to shy away
from decisions which would disrupt the established legal frameworks
of water law. Despite scientific evidence to the contrary, and the
built-in safe-yield concept of the GMA, the Arizona courts appear to
refrain from tampering with the common law doctrines. 7
c.

Arizona-Mexican Groundwater Basins

Groundwater in the Arizona-Sonora boundary area near San Luis
has been the source of conflict for some time.' 78 In a dispute over
Mexican pumping, an act which Americans claim to be an illegal taking of the Colorado River in violation of the Water Treaty of 1944,
the two countries have agreed to eliminate pumping within 5 miles of
near San Luis and to limit pumping to
the Arizona-Sonora boundary
79
annually.
feet
area
160,000
3. New Mexico
a.

Statutory Base

New Mexico groundwater, regulated by state law since 1931, is the
property of the public, subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation.180 Amendments to New Mexico laws have created a permit system, supervised by the State Engineer, which is administered under
the doctrine of appropriated rights.' 8 The State has, however, preserved by statute the use of wells for "nominal personal domestic
use." ' 82 Groundwater rights can be sold or transferred, regardless of
83
location or purpose, subject to approval by the State Engineer.
176. Collier v. Arizona Dep't of Water Resources, 722 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. 1986).
177. See John D. Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface
Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657, 740-44 (1988) (urging Arizona courts to acknowledge
hydrologic reality in pending general stream adjudications).
178. See Michael D. Bradley & Kenneth J. DeCook, Ground Water Occurrenceand Utilization in the Arizona-Sonora Border Region, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 30-32 (1978) (describing development of groundwater resources along Arizona-Sonora border).
179. Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of
the Colorado River, IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, Mex.-U.S., 24 U.S.T. 1971.
180. See Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of
CurrentIssues, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1045, 1048 (1982) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-27
(1978)).
181. See id. at 1048-52 (providing fulsome explanation of New Mexico program).
182. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-12-18 (1985).
183. See Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of
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State maps show over 75,546 square miles of underground water basins in New Mexico, approximately 2/3 of the state. 1 4 Moreover,
state courts have recognized the hydrological relationship between
85
surface and groundwater.

b.

Legal Doctrine of Prior Appropriation

New Mexico was one of the territories ceded to the United States in
1848, 16 and as such, it continued in the tradition of Mexican civil law
by recognizing that water belongs to no one. The general principle of
the prior appropriation doctrine, recognized by Mexican law, was persistently applied in New Mexico through territorial days and, in fact,
predates the New Mexico Constitution. 87 By statute, New Mexico
adopted the principle that all water in New Mexico "running in natural streams and underground belongs in effect to the state as trustee
88
for the people."'1
In New Mexico, one may acquire property rights in water. Consistent with early Spanish law, those rights may be limited by the state to
the "beneficial use" of such water. Beneficial use is defined as water
used, not water appropriated. Thus, if one ceases to use one's water,
others may claim the right to appropriate it. Today, priority dates are
assigned and those with the oldest dates may take the water, even
when water is scarce. 8 9 Water then becomes an economic
Current Issues, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1045, 1052 (1982) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-7
(1978)); id. at 1047-57 (discussing role of state engineer). The State Engineer's managerial
functions in New Mexico encompass two basic areas. Id. The first is calculating a reasonable
rate of groundwater mining for mined aquifers and second, in rechargeable aquifers, coordinating the relationships between the groundwater withdrawals and prior surface commitments in
the form of prior appropriative rights, interstate compacts, and treaties. Id.
184. Id. at 1049.
185. See generally Mathers v. Texaco, 421 P.2d 771 (N.M. 1966) (considering hydrology); City of Albuquerque, v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (N.M. 1962) (noting hydrology
principles).
186. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement
with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. 5, 9 Stat. 922, 926-28.
187. Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of Current Issues, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1045, 1046 n.12 (1982).
188. Id. at 1046-47.
189. See id. at 1045 (explaining effect of priority dates). Professor DuMars notes:
Although stated differently in the various western states, the prior appropriation system
has always contained two essential principles:
(1) The first user (appropriator) in time has the right to take and use water; and
(2) that right continues as against subsequent users as long as the appropriator
puts the water to beneficial use.
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commodity.
Groundwater in New Mexico, unlike in other states, 90 is clearly
subject to the prior appropriation doctrine. More importantly, New
Mexico is unique in recognizing the hydrological relationship between
surface waters and groundwaters. While interpreting the correct duties of the State Engineer in regulating groundwater, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico recognized the need to measure the amount of
pumped water and the amount of return flow to determine the impact
on those individuals holding rights to the surface water. The court
upheld the need to retire such surface water rights' 9 1 before permitting pumping. Thus, New Mexico has a regulated and integrated
groundwater program.
Although New Mexico has a history of managing aquifers, it still
faces future difficult allocation choices between competing prior appropriators and potential water users. 1 92 This difficulty is further
compounded by the lack of groundwater management by New Mexico's neighbor state, Texas.
c.

New Mexico Shared Basins

New Mexico shares transboundary groundwater basins with Mexico and Texas. 93 Control of these basins is further complicated by
uncontrolled pumping in Texas which has led to legal battles over the
right of Texas municipalities to pump New Mexico's groundwater in
Id. Mr. Dumars further states:
Most prior appropriation jurisdictions recognize beneficial use as the basis, the measure,
and the limit of the right to use water. The common theme in all these states is that the
beneficial use means application of water to a lawful purpose which is useful to the appropriator and at the same time is a use consistent with the general public interest in having
water utilized to its maximum.
Id.
190. See generally Robert Emmet Clark, Ground Water Law. Problem Areas, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW 377 (1975) (comparing water law in different regions).
191. See Mathers v. Texaco, 421 P.2d 771, 777 (N.M. 1966) (holding mined aquifer subject to beneficial use despite lowering of water table); City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379
P.2d 73, 81 (N.M. 1962) (upholding state engineer's finding that surface rights be retired as
necessary to protect prior stream appropriators).
192. See Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of
Current Issues, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1045, 1062 (1982) (summarizing problems of water
competitors). For example, Indian entitlement is a major entitlement problem in New Mexico
complicating the developer/farmer/municipal user issues. Id. at 1058-60.
193. J.C. Day, InternationalAquifer Management: The Hueco Bolson on the Rio Grande
River, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 163 (1978) (noting geography of New Mexico's groundwater basin).
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the face of New Mexico's permit system. 194 New Mexico's conservative approach to groundwater under the state statutes has led its unregulated neighbors to assert that New Mexico is exploiting the water
supply. 195

4.

Texas

a. Questionable Lack of Statutory Base
Texas has legislation in place to control surface water, but the state
has been reluctant to control groundwater. 196 Indeed, at least one
commentator, who has compared Texas groundwater law to other
western states, has determined that Texas groundwater law is "characterized by large voids." 197 Although Texas has enacted statutes
which broadly mandate the Texas Water Commission to create and
enforce regulations "conserving, protecting, preserving and distributing underground subterranean, and percolating water located in this
state," 198 no such rules have ever been issued. The lack of rules is
likely the result of a 1941 Attorney General Opinion declaring a statute predating the Texas Water Code, but which contained very similar language, an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 199
In a new position letter, the current Texas Attorney General recently
overturned the 1941 opinion citing subsequent Texas case law recognizing a broader base of legislative authority. 2" Pursuant to that
opinion, the Texas Water Commission issued a management plan to
194. See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 380-81 (D. N.M. 1983) (present-

ing factual dispute over water use at New Mexico-Texas border), vacated and rev'd, 597 F.
Supp. 694, 708 (D. N.M. 1984). See generally Nancy E. Herrick, Note, Recent Developments
in the El Paso/NewMexico Interstate GroundwaterControversy-The Constitutionalityof New
Mexico's New Municipality Water Planning Statute, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223 (1989) (reviewing state border water conflicts).
195. Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of Current Issues, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1045, 1054-58 (1982) (exploring arguments presented by
states bordering New Mexico).
196. Corwin W. Johnson, The Continuing Voids in Texas GroundwaterLaw: Are Concepts and Terminology to Blame?, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1281, 1281-82 (1986).
197. Id. at 1282.
198. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.011 (Vernon 1988).
199. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-54 (1991) (reversing 1941 opinion).
200. See id. (relying upon notion of generalized mandate coupled with public welfare
concerns to effectuate legislative purposes). The Attorney General opinion cites Med-Safe,
Inc. v. Texas, 752 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1988); Jordon v. State Bd. of Ins., 334 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.
1960); and Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 798 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. App.Austin 1990, writ granted). Id.
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the embattled Edwards aquifer.2 0 1 After first holding that the aquifer
was not an underground river subject to state control, a state district

202
court promptly declared the plan to be without legal authority.
Commentators have frequently pointed out the shortcomings of
Texas groundwater law which include the general absence of provisions for resolving conflicts among pumpers, the lack of integration of
groundwater and surface water rights, and the non-existence of programs designed to protect aquifers from damaging depletion. 0 3
Moreover, there is no relevant constitutional provision on ground-

water management. 2°

Commentators have repeatedly suggested that

political leaders have not faced comprehensive groundwater issues because these leaders fear the ire of landowners who will undoubtedly
claim federal and state constitutional violations. 5
The legislature has authorized the creation of voluntary under201. The uncontrolled pumping by a catfish farm owner in Bexar County of forty-five
million gallons of groundwater a day from the Edwards Aquifer has initiated heated litigation.
Dwight Silverman, Water Gusher Spilled Over into Aquifer Fight, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 15,
1992, at Al.
202. See Diana R. Fuentes, Edwards Aquifer is Not a River, State Judge Rules, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Sept. 12, 1992, at Al (discussing court's ruling). The Texas Water
Commission had declared on April 15, 1992 that the Edwards Aquifer was an underground
river and subject to laws governing surface water rights and use. TWC DesignatesAquifer as
an Underground River, Hous. POST, Apr. 16, 1992, at A26; see Todd Ackerman, Federal
Official Backs Plan for Edwards Aquifer, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1992, at A23 (discussing
TWC's classification of aquifer); Dwight Silverman, Water Gusher Spilled Over Into Aquifer
Fight, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 15, 1992, at Al (setting forth facts leading to debate over water
rights in San Antonio); Dwight Silverman, Bubbling Debate: Water Rights to Edwards Aquifer, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 15, 1992, at D12 (explaining basis of Edwards aquifer dispute).
203. See, e.g., James N. Castleberry, Jr., A Proposalfor Adoption of a Legal Doctrine of
Ground-Stream Water Interrelationshipin Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 508 (1975) (noting
that statutory provisions leave much unanswered); Corwin W. Johnson, Texas Groundwater
Law: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017, 1024-28 (1982) (pointing
out inadequacies of groundwater law in Texas); Karen H. Norris, Comment, Stagnation of
Texas Ground Water Law: Political v. Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493, 498503 (1991) (arguing that development of groundwater law inadequate in Texas); Stephen E.
Snyder, Comment, Ground Water Management: A Proposalfor Texas, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 289,
289 (1973) (remarking that Texas courts have deemed themselves powerless to control groundwater use).
204. An argument may be made, however, that Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas
Constitution, which mandates conservation of the natural resources of the state, provides
broad basis for water policy and regulation statutes. Indeed, it is cited, along with Article III,
Section 52 of the Texas Constitution, as the basis for TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 52.001,
52.548 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1993) which created underground water conservation districts.
205. E.g., Corwin W. Johnson, The Continuing Voids in Texas Groundwater Law: Are
Concept and Terminology to Blame?, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1281, 1288 (1986) (noting reasons
behind lack of legislative action).
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ground water conservation districts which are empowered to regulate

groundwater withdrawal.20 6 The Supreme Court of Texas recognized
that this legislative action was "proper" and noted the "inevitable"

conflicts which will arise and the resulting "need for additional legislation.., to cover unregulated groundwater reservoirs. 2 °7
Legislators appear to be drafting groundwater management plans

in response to the state court's dismissal of the Water Commission's
plan. Such action may prompt a concerted legislative effort to regulate
groundwater in Texas.
b.

Legal Doctrine of Absolute Ownership

Although Texas courts are bound by treaty to apply the law in

existence at the time of grants, which would force application of
Spanish law in certain situations," 8 they adopted in 1904 the English
doctrine of absolute ownership. 2 This doctrine gives the landowner
the right to "percolating waters" below his or her land, to which he or
she enjoys unlimited rights regardless of the impact upon adjoining
landowners. 210 This concept of water rights based solely on property
206. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.169 (Vernon Supp. 1993).

207. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978).
See Beckendorif v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75, 78-82 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing constitutionality of special
water districts).
208. See State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 855-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1961) (reviewing law of Spain and Mexico and its applicability in Texas) aff'd, 355
S.W.2d 502 (1962).
209. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279, 281-82 (Tex. 1904)
(holding unlimited pumping by landowner permitted despite impact on adjoining landowner).
But see Joe R. Greenhill & Thomas Gibbs Gee, Ownership of Groundwater in Texas; The East
Case Reconsidered, 33 TEX. L. REV. 620, 629 (1955) (presenting critical commentary of East
decision). See generally Harbert Davenport & J.T. Canales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters
with Special Reference to Irrigationfrom the Lower Rio Grande, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 138 (1956)
(providing complete history of Texas water law).
210. Harbert Davenport & J.T. Canales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters with Special
Reference to Irrigationfrom the Lower Rio Grande, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 138, 147 (1956). The
Texas Supreme Court relied upon the reasoning of an Ohio opinion, Frazierv. Brown, which
noted the "secret, occult, and concealed" movements of groundwater which make regulation
difficult. East, 81 S.W. at 280-81. Texas courts have clung to the doctrine of absolute ownership despite its faulty theoretical basis. See James N. Castleberry, Jr., A Proposalfor Adoption
of a Legal Doctrine of Ground-Stream Water InterrelationshipIn Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J.
503, 508-10 (1975) (discussing Texas water law doctrines). As observed by Judge Wilson:
I am convinced that the rationale of Frazier v. Brown has been rebutted and answered by
the course of our history and the entire trend of our jurisprudence since that decision and
since the East case. Although this court can close its eyes to the advancement of scientific
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rights has been consistently upheld by Texas courts. In a recent case,
Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc.,21
the court recognized established Texas property law and refused to
limit withdrawal of groundwater, absent willful waste or malice, despite subsidence of land claims by adjacent landowners. 1 2 The court,
however, did impose a new limitation upon this absolute right of ownership by establishing prospective liability for negligent pumping that
proximately causes subsidence.213 Often criticized, this doctrine of
groundwater as a property right has appeared almost intractable as an
element of the common law regime. Indeed, the Friendswood court,
while recognizing that "some aspects of the English or common law
rule as to underground water are harsh and outmoded," 21 4 felt compelled "to recognize that it has become an established rule of property
law in the state.

'21

Texas courts apparently believe water policy and

regulation to be properly within the purview of the legislature.21 6 Absent clear legislative action curtailing ownership of groundwater, the
courts will continue to sidestep fundamental redesign of groundwater
ownership.
As to judicial recognition of hydrological principles of surface and
groundwater integration, Texas courts have merely noted that if a
party could prove that the underground waters were, in fact, part of a
water course rather than percolating, the courts would apply concepts
of surface water law.217 Yet, a Texas court has never found underground water to be anything other than "percolating.

' 21 8

Thus,

and legal knowledge and governmental techniques by reaffirming this rationale as the
majority do here, I do not believe this court will always do so....
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex. 1955) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
211. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
212. Id. at 22.
213. Id. at 30.
214. Id. at 28.
215. Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 28.
216. City of Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 403.
217. See Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ
denied) (holding that water flowing into creek governed as surface water); Pecos County Water
Control and Improvement Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (interpreting Texas water law with regard to percolating waters);
Cantwell v. Zinser, 208 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948, no writ) (explaining
how court must rule if water is declared percolating).
218. Absent evidence to the contrary, a court must presume that underground water is
percolating rather than being a subterranean stream or the underflow of a river. Texas Co. v.
Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (Tex. 1927); Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ.
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Texas landowners continue to freely pump groundwater. However,
Texas lawmakers have recognized the growing scarcity of groundwater, and such recognition, impounded by the Edwards aquifer controversy, may spark new legislative efforts at comprehensive
groundwater control.2 19
c.

Shared Aquifers

New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico share aquifers at the border.
Recharge areas along the Rio Grande are being substantially endangered by overdraft and pollution through irrigation return flow, haz22 0
ardous waste, and pesticide use.
IV.

A.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING MEXICAN-UNITED
STATES AGREEMENTS

Water Treaty of 1944
1. History of Mexican-United States Water Relations

In 1880, the United States and Mexico began formal correspondence relating to the use of the Rio Grande waters. 22 1 The United
States initiated the correspondence on behalf of aggrieved Texas farmers who claimed that they had been deprived of irrigation by the Mexicans' digging ditches along the Rio Grande waters on the Mexican
border.2 22 The Mexican response, four years later, was that Mexicans
had suffered more deeply than Americans because 1880 had been a
very dry season. 223 Additionally, the Mexicans claimed that they had
prior appropriation claims to the Rio Grande water since the three
hundred-year-old dam at Ciudad Juarez had existed prior to Texas
App.-San Antonio, 1974 writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pecos County Water Control & Improvement
Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. See Karen N. Norris, Comment, The Stagnation of Texas GroundwaterLaw.: Political v. EnvironmentalStalemate, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493, 504-05 (reviewing legislative reports
and concerns over aquifer).
220. See Randall J. Charbeneau, GroundwaterResources of the Texas Rio Grande Basin,
22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957, 969-70 (1982) (discussing groundwater aquifers of Rio Grande);
William J. Lloyd, Growth of the Municipal Water System in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 943, 944-45 (1982) (illustrating problems of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico).
221. See James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the United States and Mexico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27, 27 (1938) (noting correspondence). See generally id. at 27-61 (reviewing history of United States-Mexican action pertaining to water problems from 1880-1938).
222. Id. at 27-28.
223. Id. at 28 (citing Matias Romero, Mexican Minister to Frederick T. Frelinghusen,
Secretary of State, Aug. 27, 1984, 1 MOORE, DIGEST INTERNATIONAL LAW 653 (1906)).
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settlements.224 Moreover, the Mexicans noted that waste of Rio
Grande waters by Colorado and Mexico farmers had aggravated the
22 5
transboundary scarcity of water.
Shortly after this correspondence, American companies formed to
capture abundant waters of the Rio Grande in Colorado and New
Mexico during the rainy season, intending to sell such waters to Ciudad Juarez during the dry season. 226 The M
Mexican government protested this imbalanced taking as a serious detriment to the priorestablished community of Ciudad Juarez and recommended equitable
division of the border waters.22 7
Initially, the not-surprising American reply was that a recent, serious drought near the headwaters of the Rio Grande caused the situation at Ciudad Juarez.228 Pressed further by the Mexican
government, 229 Attorney General Judson Harmon issued his interpretation of existing treaty obligations and concluded that the United
States, as an absolute sovereign nation, under accepted principles of
international law, had no duty to halt water diversions in Colorado
and New Mexico.23°
Immediately after Harmon issued his opinion, negotiations commenced resulting in joint instructions to the International Boundary
224. Id.
225. See James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the United States and Mex-

ico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27, 28 (1938) (discussing problems of water scarcity).
226. Id. at 29-30.
227. Id. at 30 n. 10. As early as 1890, the Rio Grande was left a dry bed for 580 miles due
to takings in Colorado. Id.

228. Id. at 30.
229. Some commentators view the Mexican claim as essentially one for damages. See
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in
Private Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 191, 205-17

(1973) (discussing history of Mexican claims for relief from American diverters). A recent
United States case, however, suggests damages are due to Mexican property from harm caused

by operation of dams in the United States. See Gasser v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 476, 506
(1988) (discussing flooding of Mexican property), vacated and withdrawn, 22 Cl. Ct. 165

(1990). See generally Anne M. Morgan, Note, Transboundary Liability Goes With the Flow?
Gasser v. United States: The Use and Misuse of a Treaty, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 955 (1990)
(examining Gasser decision). Such an interpretation would obviously contradict the policy of

non-liability which the United States has engaged in for a hundred years. Moreover, while the

United States publicly took this position it agreed to equitable allocation of waters at the treaty
table. To suggest United States damage liability at this juncture may seriously impede process
of negotiating a groundwater treaty similar to the Bellagio Draft which will be essential to Plan
implementation of groundwater solutions.

230. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895). Once this opinion relating to possible damage claims
was issued, prompt negotiations began adopting equitable principles.
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and Water Commission 23' (IBWC) to investigate and report on the
Rio Grande problem. To secure each country's legal and equitable
rights, the IBWC recommended that a dam be constructed across the
Rio Grande at El Paso. 23 2 Further, Mexico agreed to relinquish
2 33
claims of lost public wealth totalling thirty-five million dollars.
These provisions were adopted in the Treaty of 1906.234 Under the
1906 Treaty, the United States annually delivers 60,000 acre feet of
water to Mexico. In times of shortage, deliveries are in proportion to
the amounts of water available.235
2.

Terms of the 1944 Treaty

After signing the 1906 Treaty, and except for a brief period from
1913 to 1919, Mexico and the United States continued discussions on
border water issues. 236 After years of negotiation, the two countries
231. The Convention of 1889 established the IBWC. Act of Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512.
Initially created for a period of five years, the Convention was extended indefinitely from Dec.
24, 1900. Act of Dec. 24, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. In the original proclamation, Art. I states:
All differences or questions that may arise on that portion of the frontier between the
United States of America and the United States of Mexico where the Rio Grande and the
Colorado Rivers form the boundary line, whether such differences or questions grow out
of altercations or changes in the bed of the aforesaid Rio Grande and that of the aforesaid
Colorado River, or of works that may be constructed in said rivers, or of any other cause
affecting the boundary line, shall be submitted for examination and decision to an International Boundary Commission, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the case of said
differences or questions.
Act of Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512.
232. See James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the United States and Mexico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27, 37 (1938) (noting Commission's recommendations).
233. See id. at 38-39 (discussing sum of Mexico's claim and recommendations to solve
dispute).
234. Treaty Relating to the Rio Grande and Distribution of the Waters Thereof, May 21,
1906, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 455. See James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the
United States and Mexico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27, 48-60 (1938) (outlining history of United
States-Mexican border disputes and government responses thereto from 1906-38). Commentators have remarked that Americans used the revolutionary war period in Mexico to develop
the Colorado Basin. See Charles A. Johnston, Jr., Comment, Effluent Neighbors: The MexicoUS. Water Quality Dilemma, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 151, 161 (1972) (mentioning development
of basin); Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between Mexico
and the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderlands, 19 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 87, 110 n. 120 (1986) (noting basin conditions in early 1900s).
235. See Neal E. Armstrong, Anticipating Transboundary Water Needs and Issues in the
Mexico-United States BorderRegion in the Rio Grande Basin, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 877, 903
(1982) (explaining terms of 1906 Treaty).
236. See James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the United States and Mexico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27, 48-60 (1938) (tracing negotiations between United States and Mexico). The United States broke diplomatic relations with warring Mexico. Id.
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signed the 1944 Water Utilization Treaty (1944 Water Treaty). 237
The 1944 Water Treaty designated the IBWC as the administering
agency. The Treaty's stated purpose was to designate the rights of
Mexico and the United States to the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and the Rio Grande from Fort Quitman, Texas, to the
Gulf of Mexico. 23 8 The Rio Grande waters were allocated equally
between the two countries while the Colorado waters were formal-

ized. 239 The Treaty also established a priority of joint uses for international waters: "(1) domestic and municipal uses, (2) agriculture
and livestock raising, (3) electric power, (4) other industrial uses,
(5) navigation, (6) fishing and hunting, and (7) any other beneficial
uses which may be determined by the [IBWC]. ' ' 24 0 Article 3 of the

Treaty required both governments to "give preferential treatment to
' 241
the solution of all border sanitation problems.
Consistent with early empowering provisions, 42 the 1944 Water
Treaty gave the IBWC jurisdiction to settle all disputes arising thereunder, subject to the approval of the two governments. 243 The geo237. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande [1944 Water Treaty], Feb.
3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 25, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
238. See Neal E. Armstrong, Anticipating Transboundary Water Needs and Issues in the
Mexico-United States Border Region in the Rio Grande Basin, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 877,
903-04 (1982) (presenting legal considerations addressed in 1944 Water Treaty).
239. See Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U..-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1095 (1982) (detailing apportionment of water supply). Professor Utton reports that the apportionment has been
successful, but notes questions surrounding the drought provision as it effects apportionment
on the lower Rio Grande. Id. at 1096-98. Although some commentators have taken the position that historically Mexico has suffered in such apportionments because of the heavy-handed
negotiating stance of the dominant United States, no source material appears to support such
statements. Indeed, since 1895, it seems equal apportionment has been clearly recognized as
the proper principle of division. Cf Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation
Agreement Between Mexico and the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the
Borderlands, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 109-11 (1986) (citing Kirsten J. Anderson, Note, A
History and Interpretation of the Water Treaty of 1944, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 600, 607-13
(1972) which declares that Mexico suffered under United States influence).
240. Neal E. Armstrong, Anticipating Transboundary Water Needs and Issues in the Mexico-United States Border Region in the Rio Grande Basin, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 877, 903
(1982).
241. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande [1944 Water Treaty], Feb.

3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 3, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
242. Act of Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512.
243. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande [1944 Water Treaty], Feb.
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graphic jurisdiction of the IBWC includes the relevant parts of the
Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, as well as the land boundary between the two countries. 2 "
3. Minute 242
The decisions of the IBWC are recorded in the form of minutes,
which are deemed approved by each government if no objection is
communicated within thirty days. 245 However, the minutes are not
equivalent to a formal treaty but are considered executive agreements
if both nations ratify them. 24 6 Minute 242247 resolved a longstanding

dispute between Mexico and the United States regarding the quality
of waters delivered under the Treaty. As the Treaty contains no
water quality provision, Mexicans have endured delivery of saline
water. Under Minute 242, the United States agrees to deliver water to
Mexico with no higher saline count than that received by Americans
at the Imperial Dam.248 Mexico and the United States further agree
to limit pumping within five miles of the border near San Luis. 249 Ad3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 3, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945); see Albert E. Utton,
An Assessment of the Management of US.-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year
2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1094-95 (1982) (explaining IBWC's jurisdiction and role of
United States and Mexican governments).
244. Id.
245. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande [1944 Water Treaty], Feb.
3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 25, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
246. See Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over TransboundaryGroundwaters: Some Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 515
(1982) (discussing role of minutes).
247. Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of
the Colorado River, IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1971.
248. See Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of US..Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1098 (1982) (explaining
agreement on water quality). The United States, invoking the Harmon Doctrine, refused to
recognize a duty under international law to deliver unpolluted water absent treaty provision to
the contrary. See generally Dale Beck Furnish & Jerry R. Ladman, The ColoradoRiver Salinity Agreement of 1973 and the Mexicali Valley, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 83 (1975) (exploring
problems of salinity agreement).
249. Mexico had planned a major oil field near the San Luis border with the capacity to
extract 160,000 acre feet of water, the equivalent of one-tenth of the Mexican allotment of the
Colorado, which would have placed United States groundwater reserves at peril. Stephen P.
Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters: Some Inslitutional
and Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 505-06 (1980). Mumme further notes that subsequent to Minute 242, the United States undertook a pumping project
within the five-mile zone and delivered such waters as part of the treaty allotment. Id.
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ditionally, the agreement requires communication on "any new developments of either surface or groundwater resources. "250
4.

Minute 261

Minute 261 was issued as a response to a joint communique from
Presidents Carter and Lopez-Partillo calling upon the IBWC to recommend permanent solutions to the sanitation of waters along the
border.2 5 1 It expands the authority of the IBWC to determine when a
"border sanitation problem" exists.25 2 Moreover, it strives to define
broadly "border sanitation problems" to include: "Waters that cross
the border ...[h]ave sanitary conditions that present a hazard to the
health and well-being of the inhabitants of either side of the border or
impair the beneficial uses of these waters. ' 253 This language has been
described as "broad enough to cover the range of problems from salinity to toxic industrial wastes, and agricultural practices as well as
municipal sewage. ' 214 The language has been further interpreted to
extend jurisdiction beyond the limited parts of the Rio Grande and
Colorado Rivers dictated in the 1944 Water Treaty.2 5
Recommendation 4 of Minute 261 provides that the IBWC would
prepare a Minute for each border sanitation problem, including:
Identification of the problem, definition of conditions which require
solution, specific quality standards that should be applied, the course of
action that should be followed for its solution, and the specific time

250. Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of
the Colorado River, IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1971, art.6.
251. Recommendations for the Solution to the Border Sanitation Problems, IBWC Minute No. 261, Sept. 24, 1979, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5100. The minute notes that this recommendation was the result of a Joint Communique issued February 16, 1979. Id.
252. Id. The consent of both governments is not required, eliminating potentially timeconsuming political issues from interfering with such decisions. Id.
253. Id. Minute 261 gives such problems the highest priority. See Stephen P. Mumme,
The Background and Significance of Minute 261 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 223, 223-24 (1981) (discussing Minute 261).
254. Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1105 (1982).
255. Id. Professor Utton writes:
To interpret the language of Minute 261 more narrowly would be to defy the hydrology of
drainage basins and unduly limit the Commission's ability to identify and deal with water
contaminants which reach or have an impact in the border region, but whose source is
upstream in the drainage basin or even beyond ....
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schedule for its implementation.25 6

Despite the IBWC's historic tendency towards conservative measures, 2 1 the IBWC has repeatedly cited Recommendation 4 over the
past decade in a rather aggressive attempt to address border sanitation problems.25 8
B.

La Paz Agreement

The 1983 Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement 259 signed
at La Paz, Baja California Sur, provides a general bi-national structure under which to address environmental problems. 260 The Agreement names the environmental agencies of each nation "National
Coordinators." 26 ' Working groups in water, air, and hazardous substances have since been established. The IBWC has been noted to
"work closely" with the National Coordinators on water quality
issues.262
Annex Agreements on specific problems have been signed, dealing

with wastewater treatment facilities,2 63 accidental releases of hazardous substances, 26 transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes and

256. Recommendations for the Solution to the Border Sanitation Problems, IBWC Minute No. 261, Sept. 24, 1979, U.S.-Mex., recommendation 4, 31 U.S.T. 5100.
257. See Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters: Some Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 513
(1980) (commenting on the IBWC's reluctance to involve itself in policymaking).
258. Eg., Recommendations for the First Stage Treatment and Disposal Facilities for the
Solution of Border Sanitation Problems at San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja California,
IBWC Minute No. 270, Apr. 30, 1985, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 11267; Recommendations for the
Solution of Border Sanitation Problem at Naco, Arizona-Naco, Sonora, Minute No. 273, Mar.
19, 1987, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 11,292.
259. Agreement for Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area signed at La Paz [La Paz Agreement], Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex.,
T.I.A.S. 10827.
260. See Daniel I. Basurto Gonzlez & Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of
MaquiladoraOperations: A Note of Cautionfor U.S. Parent Corporations,22 ST. MARY'S L.J.
659, 663-64 n.15 (1991) (noting key provisions of La Paz Agreement).
261. La Paz Agreement art. 3.
262. Robert D. Hayton and Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 685 (1989).
263. Annexes to Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, Annex I, Agreement of the Cooperation for the Solution of
the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja California, July 18,
1985, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 15, 18-19 (1987).
264. Id. at Annex II, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Environment
Along the Inland International Boundary by Discharge of Hazardous Substances, July 18,
1985, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 15, 19-21 (1987).
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hazardous substances,26 5 and air pollution.2 6 6 To date, no annex
reaches groundwater issues.
V.
A.

FORMAT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN

Shortcomings of Existing Agreements

1. Scope of 1944 Water Treaty
The Plan is based upon the implementation of solutions through
existing legal framework. 267 The first step, the gathering of data on

contaminated and threatened aquifers, is clearly authorized under
Minute 242 and has, in fact, been an ongoing process for a number of

years by the IBWC.2 6' The cooperative programs for remedial solutions to groundwater contamination, which are to be developed by the
EPA, the IBWC, the SEDUE, and the CNA,2 69 will likely need an

alternative legal structure to be effective.
The 1944 Water Treaty creates a formula for distributing surface
waters between Mexico and the United States. Although the Treaty
defines water use priorities, it does not present a structure for compre-

hensive water management. 2 ° The Treaty itself contains no language
referring to water quality. The Treaty provision relating to "border
sanitation problems" 27 1 has been narrowly
IBWC.

272

interpreted by the

265. Id. at Annex III, Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America
and the United Mexican States Regarding the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
and Hazardous Substances, Nov. 12, 1986, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 15, 23-32 (1987).
266. Id. at Annex IV, Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America
and the United Mexican States Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper
Smelters Along Their Common Border, Jan. 29, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 15, 33-37 (1987).
267. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) V-1 (1992).

268. See Albert E. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1115 (1982) (discussing
Minute 242 and IBWC).
269. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y
ECOLOGiA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA
(FIRST STAGE, 1992-1994) V-1 to V-54 (1992).
270. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande [1944 Water Treaty], Feb.
3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 25, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945). The Treaty list
concerning international water places domestic and municipal uses over all other usage. Id.
271. Id. art. 3.
272. See Stephen P. Mumme, The Background and Significance of Minute 261 of the
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Notwithstanding such previous interpretation, the IBWC negotiated Minute 261 which arguably extends IBWC jurisdiction over
water quality issues.2 73 As any solution to groundwater contamination will necessarily include restrictions on pumping, it is also noteworthy that the IBWC successfully concluded Minute 242 which
restricts pumping on both sides of the border.27 4
Plan solutions shall be shaped as answers to drinking water, water
quality, and water supply problems. Remedial groundwater solutions
fueled by sanitation and health concerns could be addressed by the
IBWC on an interim basis in the form of minutes. Such minutes,
albeit ostensibly limited by the geographic definitions of the Treaty
itself, might be negotiated upon recognition of an imperiled or contaminated transboundary aquifer. Consistent with the IBWC's approach to border sanitation problems over the last decade, such a
solution, though imperfect, may provide a reasonable avenue under
the Plan, pending recognition of a comprehensive groundwater treaty.
Given the slow pace of the negotiations between national and international legal regimes to integrate surface and groundwater, Professor
Teclaff's prediction over a decade ago may prove to be quite
insightful:
It is likely .

.

. that in international practice the areal unit of this

coordinated management will be neither the river basin or the aquifer,
but an artificial unit comprising both or parts of both, whose boundaries
will be determined by the range of mutually felt effects of water use.
The extent of groundwater pollution would then become an important,
if not the most important, factor in establishing the areal limits of 275
this
international unified management of transfrontier water resources.
The Minutes, however, have questionable binding authority, absent

InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 223, 223 & 226 (1981)
(suggesting that IBWC has sought to avoid controversy over propriety of its jurisdiction).

273. Recommendations for the Solution to Border Sanitation Problems, IBWC Minute
261, Sept. 24, 1979, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5100.

274. Mumme has stated that the United States has initiated pumping within the restricted five-mile zone. Stephen P. Mumme, The US-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary
Groundwaters: Some Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
505, 506 (1980). The IBWC stated that no unauthorized pumping has taken place. Telephone
Interview with Manuel Ybarra, Secretary of the IBWC, El Paso, Tex. (Dec. 1992).
275. Ludwik A. Teclaff, Principlesfor Transboundary GroundwaterPollution Control, 22
NAT. RESOURCES J. 1065, 1065 (1982).
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specific authorization in the Treaty.2"6 Should the Plan solutions be
framed in a Minute, they will be subject arguably to substantive, and
perhaps persuasive, legal attack. Given the unbridled right to pump
groundwater that Texans have enjoyed, it is highly predictable that a
negotiated Minute affecting groundwater pumping in Texas will face
the claims of an irate landowner that the Minute itself is invalid because the Treaty does not grant clear authority to so regulate
groundwater.
2. Annex Under La Paz Agreement
The Plan firmly establishes that the IBWC will play a substantial
role in solving all water problems. Consequently, negotiating an annex giving the IBWC-a creature of the Water Treaty-significant
responsibility for implementing groundwater pollution control to resolve a "common problem in the Border Area"27 may be within the
scope of the La Paz Agreement. The annex could be drafted to adopt
a "Bilateral Coordination Scheme"27 8 similar to that proposed in the
newly proposed Puerto Vallarta Draft Treaty." 9 The central problem, however, will be the lack of a groundwater treaty from which to
draw criteria. The annex might adopt the principles of the Bellagio
Draft Treaty pending negotiation of a comprehensive groundwater
treaty.
3. Other Troublesome Issues
The Plan notes the impact of hazardous waste on water quality. To
control adequately that impact, restricted land zones on each side of
the border may require designation. Additionally, because pesticide
use has been cited as a source of contamination, both nations will
likely need to demand increased regulation. Wastewater, tackled consistently by the IBWC, appears to require additional construction for
276. Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over TransboundaryGroundwaters:
Some Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 515 (1980).
277. Agreement for Cooperation and Improvement of the Environment in the Border
Area at La Paz [La Paz Agreement], Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., art. 3, T.I.A.S. 10827.
278. See Alberto Szekely, et al., TransboundaryHydrocarbonResources: The Puerto Vallarta Draft Treaty, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 609, 639-45 (1991) (presenting coordination
scheme).
279. See id. (discussing framework of Puerto Vallarta Treaty). The noted scholars who
drafted the treaty state that their design technique was "directly taken from the 1983 La Paz
Agreement for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment between Mexico and the
United States which has already yielded significant Annexes." Id. at 644.
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proper control. These concerns raise the question of an enforcement
body empowered with specific authority to manage a range of relevant
issues. Actual regulation may be more desirably left in the hands of
the sovereigns. Nonetheless, to address comprehensively the groundwater problems, the Plan's solutions must provide some mechanism
to reach all appropriate elements of the contamination problems.
Moreover, as groundwater solutions will require pumping controls,
it must again be noted that no treaty exists which deals either directly
or indirectly with groundwater. The 1944 Treaty deals with surface
water. "Mass balance" cannot be ignored. If pumping is prohibited
as part of the solution to groundwater problems, allocated waters
under the Treaty are certain to be affected.28 0 This problem, in itself,
will require a firm legal framework. Moreover, resolution of pumping
issues requires equitable allocation of groundwater use. As evidenced
by Supreme Court decisions,2"' this doctrine is subject to varying interpretations. As such, allocation factors agreeable to both nations
must be included in any proposal. To effectively provide for the necessary groundwater remedial solutions under the Plan, a new treaty
must be negotiated. The existing legal framework does not contemplate the legal action required to gradually implement complete
groundwater contamination remedial solutions.
With the historical conflicts in the legal doctrines governing
groundwater, as well as the differing statutory bases of sovereign
states, it is imperative that Mexico and the United States clearly delineate the legal jurisdiction to resolve groundwater issues. To finally
approach determination of such difficult issues with a weak legal
structure would only impede the first priority of the Plan.
B. Adoption of Bellagio Draft Treaty

Despite an increasing recognition of the world's reliance on a
shrinking groundwater base,282 few treaties deal specifically with
280. To argue application of hydrological principles to the treaty implies that specific
language must be developed to regulate groundwater.
281. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517
(1936); Wyoming v. Colorado, 254 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907);
see Richard A. Simms, Equitable Apportionment-Prioritiesand New Uses, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549, 551-62 (1989) (discussing doctrine of equitable allocation).
282. See Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 674-76 (1989) (discussing effects of diminish-
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transboundary aquifers.2 3 Anticipating the need for a legal mechanism through which to resolve transboundary groundwater problems,
scholars worked for eight years to draft an agreement which could be
used as a realistic starting point. 284 As the basis of the Treaty, the
Bellagio drafters put forth the simple notion "that water rights should
be determined by mutual agreement rather than be the subject of uncontrolled, unilateral taking, and that rational conservation and protection actions require joint resource management machinery. '28 5
The Treaty utilizes three concepts to minimize any potential intrusion
into a nation's sovereignty: (1) creation of zones where contamination or depleted recharge have reached critical stages; (2) enforcement through the home country's agencies with oversight by an
international agency; and (3) limited substantive provisions, but full
administrative powers to the international agency. 28 6 The IBWC is
likely the appropriate international agency since it has enjoyed a
highly successful role resolving western border problems.
The Treaty specifically embraces the concept of applying an integrated approach to the "underground environment, ' 28 7 including
"conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater in [the] border
region." 2 8 Accordingly, the proposed Comprehensive Management
Plan demands consideration of hydrogeology.
Under the Treaty, Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Ar-

ing groundwater resources). Potential water shortage problems exist in the Middle East as
well as Africa. See id.at 674-75 (noting groundwater shortages in Middle East and Africa).
283. Id. Hayton and Utton refer to the treaty between Poland and the USSR, which
contains groundwater provisions. Id. at 159. See LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 497-512 (1985) (discussing history of European groundwater pollution and treaties in modern times).
284. In 1978, Professor Utton proposed possible alternatives for management of such
issues. See Albert E. Utton, InternationalGroundwater Management: The Case of the U.S.Mexican Frontier,57 NEB. L. REV. 633, 640-45 (1978) (discussing four options for groundwater management). Scientific and legal scholars first met in Mexico in 1985 to draft a proposal which anticipated the Mexican-United States situation. See Ann Berkley Rodgers & Albert
E. Utton, Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, 25
NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 727-72 (1985) (outlining draft agreement). The most recent effort
combines the work of earlier years, but includes adjustments. See Robert D. Hayton and
Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 676-722 (1989) (outlining Bellagio draft agreement).
285. Robert D. Hayton and Albert E. Utton, TransboundaryGroundwater: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 664 (1989).
286. Id. at 664-65.
287. Id. at 677.
288. Id.
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eas (TGCAs) could be designated based on threat or actual impairment of an aquifer.289 When designating TGCAs, the joint agency
should consider "sources and uses of water previously allocated by
agreement between the Parties or under the Drought Management
Plan."' 29° The Official Comments indicate the drafters wanted to
make certain that determinations were consistently based on clearly
discernible factors and were in context to that region.29'
The Comprehensive Management Plans for the TGCAs may, in an
attempt to eliminate, prevent, or mitigate degradation of the groundwater quality, "allocate uses of groundwater and interrelated surface
' 292
waters taking into account previous allocations in the TGCA.
The factors to be considered in "allocation of the uses of groundwater
and interrelated surface waters" 29 3 include:
a. hydrogeology and meteorology;
b. existing and planned uses;
c. environmental sensitivity;
d. quality control requirements;
e. socio-economic implications (including dependency);
f. water conservation practices (including efficiency of water use);
g. artificial recharge potential; and
h. comparative costs and implications of alternative sources of supply.
The weight to be given each factor is to be determined by its importance
in comparison with that of the other relevant factors.294
Allocation, thus, may include consideration of water allotments
289. See Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J.663, 692 (1989) (providing contents of Article VII
of Bellagio Draft Treaty).
290. Id. at 693.
291. Id. at 694-95 (presenting Official Comments 5 and 6 concerning Article VII of the
Treaty).
292. Id. at 696.
293. Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 696 (1989) (Art. VII, paragraph 2b).
294. Id. at 696-97. It is important to note that such factors have become accepted internationally since the adoption of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers by the International Law Association in 1966. Two Helsinki factors are excluded from
this list:
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin states as a means of
adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied without causing substantial injury to a co-basin state.
Id. at 699-701 (Official Comment to Art. VII of Treaty citing International Law Association,
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Article V, London 1967)).
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under the 1944 Water Treaty and may anticipate interim adjustments
in those allocations as necessary to protect the aquifer. Therefore,
provision is made for hydrological principles and legal interference
with 1944 Water Treaty allotments.
Moreover, the Management Plans permit the "establishment of
protective zones in which land use may be regulated. ' 29 The Draft
Treaty, commendable in its comprehensive approach to transboundary groundwater issues, would permit implementation of the
solutions anticipated by the Plan.
C.

The Draft Treaty and the Border Plan
1. Common Elements

The Border Plan and the Bellagio Draft share similar approaches.
Both favor use of an international agency for oversight, the IBWC.2 9 6
Rather than applying a generalized approach, both prefer studying
and identifying troubled aquifers and limiting solutions to those
zones. Management and enforcement through the IBWC, though not
specifically indicated in the Plan, appears implicit. Although the Plan
may have deliberately shaped groundwater issues in border sanitation-water quality terms so as to more neatly fall within the 1944
Water Treaty and Minute 261, the reach of those agreements is insufficient to allow for the complexities of water allocation and land use.
2.

Use Allocation

The Draft Treaty is premised on water use allocation considering
the listed factors by the IBWC. Such allocation necessarily dictates
value judgments by the IBWC; however, the IBWC has historically
shied away from politically controversial issues. 297 The indubitably
295. Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwater: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 696 (1989) (discussing Article VIII of Treaty).
296. Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwater.- The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 665 (1989). The Bellagio Draft declares that the
IBWC should be given the authority to determine critical areas along the Mexican-United
States border. Id.
297. See Helen M. Ingram, State Governments Officials' Role in U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Resource Issues, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 431, 441 (1988) (noting action by the
IWBC); Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in TransboundaryResource
Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 663-76 (1990) (examining organizational politics under IBWC).
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complex issues relating to such water allocation decisions underscore
the need for clear-cut treaty language, coupled with appropriately delineated management powers.298
Balancing allocation issues in a transboundary situation is complicated by sovereign sensitivities and is challenged when emphasis on
different economic sectors varies between the countries. Further adding to the complexity is the national and cultural heritage of Mexico
that fosters the belief that the right to water is fundamental.
The Draft provides that once transboundary allocations are made,
water allotments are to be managed by each sovereign, which would
recognize, absent federal groundwater legislation, the border states'
right to distribute and manage such water based on home legal regimes. Should such allotments interfere with previous allocation
under the 1944 Treaty, the states must coordinate usage. This arrangement may well have the laudable effect of forcing hydrogeologic
reality into the legal systems of recalcitrant states. It also may result
in creating the least amount of disruption in each sovereign's legal
regime.
On the United States side of the border, changing legal doctrines
have threatened the previously well-recognized sovereignty states
have over water.29 9 Changing priorities have recently persuaded the
courts that the doctrine of equitable apportionment may shift the emphasis from protecting existing economic uses to protecting planned
uses. Intrusion of federal environmental statutes upon state management of waters has begun to entangle even more deeply state water
allocation issues."° In allocation decisions, the IBWC must not be
placed in the awkward position of inherently resolving interstate conflicts as well as international conflicts.

298. The current dispute over American interpretation of the 1944 Treaty and Minute
242 gives evidence of the difficulties which arise under Treaties which do not consider hydrology. See John H. Coghlin, All American Canal Project Sparks Test Casefor Transboundary
GroundwaterLaw, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 174-76 (1991) (discussing problems
with 1944 Water Treaty and Minute 242).
299. Charles P. DuMars & A. Van Tarlock, New Challenges to State Water Sovereignty,
29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 331, 334-36 (1989) (reviewing interference by judicial actions, federal
programs, and economic pressures).
300. See generally Kevin M. O'Brien, Comment, New Conditionsfor Old Water Rights:
An Examination of the Sources and Limits of State Authority, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
§ 24 (1960) (discussing efforts to allocate water use).
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3. Impact of the American Conflict
Internal disputes within the United States will probably threaten a
proposal to adopt a Bellagio-type treaty. Water allocation in the
western states, traditionally controversial, will become undeniably the
most hotly-debated political and legal issue in the next century. The
Supreme Court has indicated flexibility not only in determining equitable allocation, but also in limiting states' sovereign rights.
D. The American Conflict
Recent court cases demonstrate that the judiciary lacks enthusiasm
for unlimited state control of state water resources. 30 1 As the Court
moves away from the traditional recognition of state ownership of
water as an extension of the police power, states are placed in a tenuous position regarding use and conservation of its own resources.
Without a federal statute recognizing groundwater conservation and
management as a priority, the Supreme Court has been placed in the
position of superficially dealing with a complex problem. This superficial treatment is particularly troublesome when the issue of instream appropriation of surface waters arises and is not considered in
a hydrological context.3 °2
As supplies diminish and costs escalate, pressure has mounted to
consider water as an economic commodity. The Court has indicated
it will recognize state authority to manage the wealth of such water
markets. Therefore, it would appear that the tenacity of United States
border states to adhere to outdated property right notions, and the
concomitant lack of state and federal legislation regulating groundwater, will enhance a federal court view of water as a commodity
subject to the commerce clause.30 3 As environmentalists and conser-

301. E.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). Sporhase was the Supreme Court's
first attempt to deal with groundwater disputes. See Albert E. Utton, In Search ofan Integrating Principle for Interstate Water Law, Regulation and the Market Plan, 25 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 985, 986 (1985) (describing Sporhase as first groundwater case). See generally id. (suggesting
balanced and integrated approach to interstate water law).
302. See generally Brian E. Gray, A Reconsideration of Instream Appropriative Water
Rights in California, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 667 (1989) (urging recognition of instream appropriative water rights); Margaret Z. Ferguson, Comment, Instream Appropriations and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Conserving Water for the Future, 75 GEO. L.J. 1701 (1987) (recommending
states adopt statutes securing water rights).
303. See generally Arthur H. Chan, To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of Water
Rights in New Mexico, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629 (1989) (addressing competitive water markets); Bonnie G. Colby, Economic Impacts of Water Law-State Law and Water Market Devel-
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vationists are acutely aware, the use of market forces to regulate water
may threaten to eliminate seemingly non-economic uses. Arguably,
this economic view of water may encourage further development if
courts grant municipalities priority usage.
The American conflict over water usage must, however, be
subordinated to the Plan's consideration of groundwater. Domestic
turmoil should be recognized as such, and should not be permitted to
interfere with the adoption of a legally sufficient framework to address
transboundary management of aquifers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Border Plan is commendable because it publicly recognizes the
need to study the imperiled border aquifers to offer remedial resolutions. Moreover, it embraces hydrological principles in approaching
drinking water supply problems, thereby forcing both sides of the border to recognize mass balance.
Resolution of the aquifer issue at the border will demand participation of the states, regardless of their conflicting statutory frameworks
and common law doctrines. Without a federal statute prioritizing
groundwater usage and creating integrated management, each state
will be left to represent its citizens in the most vociferous of legal
arenas. It is water which will force all citizens of all nations to recognize the very real physical limitations of the planet. Though frustrated and angry, all citizens must make choices to prioritize
longevity of the human race. Accordingly, the legal system must provide a framework by which to accomplish that goal. Courts and legislators must eliminate age-old myths of the mysterious nature of
waters and recognize hydrology.
Arguments over the proper legal doctrine to apply to the issue of
pumping rights revolve in a current of outdated legal analysis, an
analysis emphasizing property rights instituted during expansionist
eras but now being applied to a shrinking planet. The introduction of
water marketing as a leveling mechanism should provoke the serious
concern not only of municipalities attempting to provide safe and inexpensive drinking water, but also forward-thinking leaders searching
for a future food supply and conservationists fighting to protect the

opment in the Southwest, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721 (1988) (discussing water markets and
water transfers).
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environment and whose values, although priceless, represent an elusive economic value in dollar-related water rights schemes. Additionally, the impact of a water market-based approach on one side of the
border, versus a fundamental rights approach on the other side, could
create future complications for establishing equitable water-use
allocations.
Given the turmoil and complexity of the domestic legal regimes
surrounding groundwater, the Bellagio Draft Treaty should be
adopted to accomplish the worthy groundwater goals of the Border
Plan. This approach, when enforced by the sovereign states, will be
more tenable because it causes the least disruption. Although man is
not yet ready to reacknowledge that water belongs to no one, and
certain sovereign states are not willing to recall ancient equitable principles upon which water distribution was historically based, the governments of the United States and Mexico have nonetheless rather
remarkably agreed that protection of groundwater is now imperative.
The thorny legal dilemma of groundwater under the Plan must be
resolved by adopting an appropriate treaty. The Bellagio Draft merits, at a minimum, serious consideration as the basis of negotiation
between the two nations.
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